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ABSTRACT—In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress was poised to make
deep cuts to the nation’s two largest anti-poverty programs: Medicaid and the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), commonly known as
“food stamps.” Yet, despite a unified, GOP-led federal government for the first
time in over a decade, those efforts failed. Meanwhile, the Trump
Administration and its allies in state government continue to pursue different
strategies to roll back entitlements to medical and food assistance. As public
interest lawyers challenge these agency actions in federal court, roughly five
million Americans’ health insurance and food assistance hang in the balance.
This Article asks why Medicaid and SNAP have proven so resilient. The
answer lies in the fiscal federalism that governs them and the federal litigation
that reinforces them. Food and healthcare programs for poor Americans are
shaped by several institutions: Congress, federal and state agencies, state
legislatures, and courts. The federal government pays for 100% of SNAP
benefits. States pay for up to half of the costs of administering the program,
but SNAP’s substantive benefits are free to the states. For Medicaid, states
contribute to the substantive benefits, but the federal government pays the
lion’s share. As one would expect, when the substance of the benefit is free but
the procedures surrounding the benefit are not, states are reluctant to impose
procedural barriers for which the state must pay to prevent its residents from
accessing benefits which cost the state nothing. As a result, the fiscal rules
surrounding these programs engender an unholy, but not unstable, alliance
between public interest lawyers and state administrators—one that prevents the
gutting of these benefit programs. When states do attempt to restrict access to
these programs, public interest lawyers can rely on statutory provisions and
administrative law to contest these cuts in federal court.
In unearthing this legal infrastructure, this Article offers a new account of
welfare litigation, one that sharpens and updates Charles Reich’s theory of
government benefits in The New Property. This Article also challenges the
conventional wisdom that procedural protections undermine substantive rights.
Finally, it disputes the widely held belief that litigation is a poor tool for
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protecting poor people’s rights. Rather, public interest litigation has played a
key role in Medicaid and SNAP’s durability.
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INTRODUCTION
Last October, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
heard oral argument to decide whether the Trump Administration could permit
Arkansas, Kentucky, and other states to impose work requirements on
Medicaid recipients. Experts estimated that 195,000 people would have lost
their health insurance as a result of these two states’ efforts.1 Had Arkansas and
1 See Amy Goldstein, Appeals Panel Expresses Skepticism About Medicaid Work Requirements, WASH.
POST (Oct. 11, 2019, 1:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/appeals-panel-expressesskepticism-about-medicaid-work-requirements/2019/10/11/a8357c4e-eb8a-11e9-9c6d-
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Kentucky’s actions succeeded, at least twenty states would have followed suit.2
Imposing work requirements on such a scale threatens the health insurance of
two million Americans.
The same day the D.C. Circuit considered the legality of the proposed
Medicaid changes, three federal district court judges in California, New York,
and Washington State granted nationwide injunctions blocking the Trump
Administration’s final rule on public charge. This public charge regulation
would have both empowered consular officials to deny entry to and
immigration judges to order removal of legal immigrants on the grounds that
they or their family members were likely to access or had accessed anti-poverty
programs like Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP), commonly known as “food stamps.” Those injunctions met different
fates in the Second and Ninth Circuits. The Ninth Circuit stayed the injunctions
in California and Washington.3 The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s
injunction,4 only to be overruled by the Supreme Court’s temporary stay.5 Like
the Medicaid work requirement litigation, the public charge litigation will wind
its way through the federal courts in the coming months. However, unlike the
Medicaid work requirement litigation, the Supreme Court has signaled its
interest in resolving this controversy. If the public charge regulation does go
into effect, experts estimate millions will disenroll in Medicaid and SNAP,
including anywhere from 875,000 to 2,000,000 citizen children who would
lose their health insurance.6
A few weeks after the D.C. Circuit argument, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) finalized its work requirement rule for SNAP recipients.
At the time, researchers estimated 755,000 people would lose food assistance.7
As with the Medicaid work requirements, legal aid attorneys challenged these

436a0df4f31d_story.html [https://perma.cc/9KV7-QENQ] (identifying about 95,000 individuals at risk in
Kentucky and 100,000 at risk in Arkansas).
2 See infra Section I.B. At the time of this writing, the Trump Administration and the State of Arkansas
have filed petitions for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir.
2020), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 20-37 & 20-38 (July 13, 2020).
3 City of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019).
4 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Nos. 19-3591 & 19-3595, 2020 WL 95815 (2d Cir. Jan.
8, 2020).
5 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (order granting stay).
6 SAMANTHA ARTIGA, ANTHONY DAMICO & RACHEL GARFIELD, KAISER FAM. FOUND., POTENTIAL
EFFECTS OF PUBLIC CHARGE CHANGES ON HEALTH COVERAGE FOR CITIZEN CHILDREN (2018),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Potential-Effects-of-Public-Charge-Changes-on-HealthCoverage-for-Citizen-Children [https://perma.cc/F6CM-JBUZ].
7 LAURA WHEATON, URB. INST., ESTIMATED EFFECT OF RECENT PROPOSED CHANGES TO SNAP
REGULATIONS 6 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101368/estimated_effect_of
_recent_proposed_changes_to_snap_regulations_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJF7-8DR8].
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regulations in federal court and secured a preliminary injunction before the
final rule could go into effect. While the Trump Administration has filed its
appeal,8 Congress has scuttled the final regulation by prohibiting the USDA’s
regulation during the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic.9 Together, these
three administrative actions, if implemented, would result in millions losing
health insurance and food assistance in a matter of months.
Despite the expected blast radius of these proposals, most legal scholars
have paid them no mind. Understandably, the health law community sees the
Medicaid changes in the broader context of an effort to undo the Affordable
Care Act (ACA). Similarly, immigration scholars and practitioners see the
public charge regulation as one of several anti-immigrant proposals from the
Trump Administration. Yet, outside of these fields, scholars have failed to see
these controversies in federal court as worthy of sustained inquiry, let alone
one that calls into question the nature of the American welfare state. The legal
academy’s neglect of these controversies stems, in part, from the fact that for
the last half century, welfare has been ignored as a site of public law. When
the Supreme Court declined to consider further constitutional welfare
challenges in the early 1970s, the professoriate followed.10 The broader public
law community has let this field lie fallow for far too long.
This Article seeks to explain why the Trump Administration and the
115th Congress’s efforts to fundamentally reshape the American safety net
have failed—at least so far. Despite their near-total control of the presidency,
Congress, and state government, ideological opponents of these programs have
not easily dismantled food and medical assistance. It shows why the Trump
Administration has resorted to an interlocking strategy, what I call “devolved,
disaggregated conditionality,” to undermine Medicaid and SNAP. These
welfare-cutting efforts from 2016 to 2019 by the Legislative and Executive
Branches show the process of retrenchment is still subject to the rule of law.11
Notice of Appeal, District of Columbia v. Dep’t of Agric., No. 1:20-cv-119 (D.D.C. May 12, 2020)
(filed by Sec’y Perdue, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.).
9 See Ashraf Khalil, USDA to Appeal Ruling, Seeks Food Stamp Change amid Pandemic, ASSOC. PRESS
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://apnews.com/e2a2e9be5950a98f4dabcc2649aef332 [https://perma.cc/JA9EW3XK]; Lola Fadulu, Trump Backs Off Tougher Food Stamp Work Rules for Now, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/us/politics/trump-food-stamps-delay.html [https://perma.cc/
N2QA-SMGF]; see also Families First Coronavirus Response Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 2301,
134 Stat. 178, 187–88 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2011).
10 For a discussion of the exceptions, see infra Section I.A.1.
11 See Jonah D. Levy, Welfare Retrenchment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE WELFARE STATE
552–65 (Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis Herbert Obinger & Christopher Pierson eds.,
2010) (discussing scholarly treatment of this term). The classic study of welfare retrenchment is Paul
Pierson’s comparative analysis of the Reagan Administration and the Thatcher government. PAUL PIERSON,
DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER, AND THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 131–63
8
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The Trump Administration’s efforts have stalled, tied up by several federal
lawsuits that have secured injunctive relief for SNAP and Medicaid recipients.
The Medicaid and SNAP cases in federal courts demonstrate both the enduring
vitality of welfare litigation and the durability of medical and food assistance
in the United States.
Why have Medicaid and SNAP proven so tough to cut? The answer to
this puzzle lies in the combination of the fiscal federalism peculiar to these
programs and the doctrinal framework laid out by the Supreme Court fifty
years ago. That framework stems from Professor Charles Reich’s famous
article, The New Property, which posited that government itself was
increasingly the source of property that individuals needed to survive.12
Drawing on Reich’s theory in Goldberg v. Kelly in 1970, the Supreme Court
held that a state agency can only terminate a recipient’s welfare benefit in a
manner that comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.13 In dissent, Justice Hugo Black worried that the political
branches would pay for these court-imposed procedural safeguards by
reducing the substantive benefits themselves, perversely hurting the very
people the Court sought to protect.14 The Supreme Court echoed Justice
Black’s reasoning in Mathews v. Eldridge in 1976, which remains the Court’s
leading procedural due process case.15
What Justice Black overlooked in his dissent in Goldberg and the
Supreme Court misidentified in Mathews is that there is not just one institution
that responds to judicial rulings on welfare administration. These programs are
governed concurrently by Congress, federal and state agencies, state
legislatures, and courts. The federal government foots the bill for all SNAP
benefits. States pay for up to half of the costs of administering the program,
but SNAP’s substantive benefits are free to the states. For Medicaid, while

(1994); see also R. Shep Melnick, Subterranean Politics Blues, 54 TULSA L. REV. 271, 272 (2019) (defining
the “distinctive politics of retrenchment” as “taking away benefits and privileges previously granted” (citing
PIERSON, supra)). Legal scholars occasionally draw on this work and the wider literature, especially to
discuss the curtailment of civil rights. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and
Retrenchment in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 43–47 (2018); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1564–67, 1582 (2014)
(relying on Pierson’s framework); Twinette L. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board: Re-Entrenching
the Higher Education Act to Restore Its Historical Policy of Access, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 547–51 (2014)
(same); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 921, 1024–26 (2003) (synthesizing efforts to curtail disability benefits); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1101–02 (2001) (discussing retrenchment in tort
liability).
12 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
13 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
14 Id. at 278–79 (Black, J., dissenting).
15 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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states do contribute to the cost of substantive benefits, the federal government
pays for the vast majority and can even wholly subsidize the states, as seen in
the ACA’s most recent expansion of Medicaid that was intended to be free to
states for several years. As one would expect when the substance of the benefit
is free but the procedures surrounding the benefit are not, states should be
reluctant to impose procedural barriers that prevent its residents from accessing
benefits for which the state does not pay. As a result, the fiscal rules
surrounding these programs engenders an unholy, but not unstable, alliance
between public interest lawyers and state administrators. When states do erect
procedural hurdles in part due to ideological preferences, they must contend
with fighting back legal challenges in federal court. The procedural protections
for SNAP and Medicaid stem less from constitutional law and more from
federal statutes and regulations. Since the federal courts still treat welfare
benefits as a property interest, public interest lawyers have standing and a
cause of action to trigger review of agency action that impinges on these
benefits.
By revisiting Reich’s theory and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in those
cases, this Article updates the “New Property” theory for our time, precisely at
the moment when the two anti-poverty programs that millions of Americans
receive are under attack. As the New Property has aged, the two largest antipoverty programs in America have fed on that theory’s legacy, albeit in
unexpected ways. The federal government spends $60 billion annually on
SNAP, nearly as much as spending on K–12 education, the Environmental
Protection Agency’s budget, and the National Aeronautics Space
Administration’s budget combined.16 In the 2018 Farm Bill, the omnibus
legislation that authorizes all federal agriculture and nutrition spending for five
years, SNAP made up over 80% of the legislation’s expenditures.17 That
spending reaches a wide swath of the country: nearly forty-three million

16 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND
COSTS
(2020),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/SNAPsummary-6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MGJ-S35A]; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATION DEPARTMENT BUDGET BY MAJOR
PROGRAM (2018), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/edhistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MS7Y-TWGM]; ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, FY 2019: EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF (2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-02/documents/fy-2019-epa-bib.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
M5D3-G82C]; NASA, FY 2020: EXPLORE BUDGET ESTIMATES BRIEFING BOOK (2020),
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fy2020_summary_budget_brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q3KP-UBLL]; see also Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036(a)). The name was changed to Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) in 2008. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 4001,
122 Stat. 923, 1092.
17 See infra Section II.A.2.
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Americans receive SNAP.18 SNAP’s ubiquity explains why it is considered a
vital countercyclical tool in economic downturns.19
Surpassing SNAP in spending, Medicaid is, after Social Security and
Medicare, the most expensive domestic program in the federal budget.20
However, unlike Social Security and Medicare, Medicaid expenditures
implicate American federalism. Medicaid is the largest contribution the federal
government makes to state budgets.21 And even though the federal government
pays for nearly two-thirds of Medicaid’s $600 billion price tag,22 states spend
more of their own revenue on Medicaid than anything else except public
schools.23 Intended as a targeted program to serve poor families, Medicaid now
accounts for one in every six dollars spent on health care.24
Moreover, both programs loom large in the political life of the country.
During the most recent government shutdown, state governments, social
service providers, and retailers agonized over what would happen if forty
million Americans did not receive their SNAP benefits on time.25 The Supreme
18 See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM,
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/34SNAPmonthly-7b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QZX7-2U2C] (data as of July 10, 2020).
19 In the depths of the 2008 financial crisis, White House advisers relied on the macroeconomic
multiplier effect of SNAP. See Peter Ganong & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Decline, Rebound, and Further
Rise in SNAP Enrollment: Disentangling Business Cycle Fluctuations and Policy Changes, 10 AM. ECON.
J. 153, 154 (2018). See generally KENNETH HANSON, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORT
NO. 103, THE FOOD ASSISTANCE NATIONAL INPUT-OUTPUT MULTIPLIER (FANIOM) MODEL AND
STIMULUS EFFECTS OF SNAP (2010).
20
See GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 7-5700, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES
FOR
FY2019
AND
BEYOND
7
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45202.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4GW-7QWX] (“The largest mandatory programs, Social Security, Medicare, and the
federal share of Medicaid, constituted 48% of all federal spending in FY2017.”); Robin Rudowitz, Kendal
Orgera & Elizabeth Hinton, Medicaid Financing: The Basics, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-financing-the-basics-issue-brief/ [https://perma.cc/FVU4M6GW].
21 Rudowitz et al., supra note 20.
22 See Federal and State Share of Medicaid Spending, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.
kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federalstate-share-of-spending [https://perma.cc/5ELT-Z4SA]; NHE Fact
Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet
[https://perma.cc/
TRR8-2RVB].
23 See NHE Fact Sheet, supra note 22 (noting the health expenditures of various states); Alex Boucher
& Barb Rosewicz, Medicaid Consumes Growing Slice of States’ Dollars, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Apr. 22,
2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2015/04/medicaid-consumes-growingslice-of-states-dollars [https://perma.cc/Q2C3-CNE5].
24
Rudowitz et al., supra note 20. More than 90% of nonelderly beneficiaries had incomes below 200%
of the federal poverty level (FPL); 54% were below 100% FPL. See JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED
DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL POLITICS 9–10 (2018).
25 See Helena Bottemiller Evich, States Warn Food Stamp Recipients to Budget Early Benefit Payments
Due to Shutdown, POLITICO (Jan. 15, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/15/state-
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Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
has pushed the decision to participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion down
to every governor’s office and state legislature in the nation.26 By rendering the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion optional, the Court unleashed a series of pitched
legislative battles and bipartisan compromises in Louisiana, Maine, and
Michigan,27 as well as high-profile ballot initiatives in Idaho, Nebraska, and
Utah.28 Across every dimension—the number of people served, the billions of
dollars spent, cases that wind their way through the federal courts, political
footballs kicked up Pennsylvania Avenue by the White House, back down by
Congress, and across the country to every state capitol—SNAP and Medicaid
controversies persist in the most important arenas of the American
administrative state.
The resilience of SNAP and Medicaid defies received wisdom. Historians
characterize the American welfare state as stunted, especially when compared
to those in other wealthy democracies.29 Some social scientists and legal
food-stamp-benefits-shutdown-2491182 [https://perma.cc/SB9F-Z2HQ]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., USDA Announces Plan to Protect SNAP Participants Access to SNAP in February (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/01/08/usda-announces-plan-protect-snap-participantsaccess-snap-february [https://perma.cc/S6TL-DEL5] (explaining the Department’s plans to fund February
benefits).
26 See 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (“Congress may offer the States grants and require the States to comply
with accompanying conditions, but the States must have a genuine choice whether to accept the offer.”); see
also Akeiisa Coleman & Rachel Nuzum, Up Close: Legislative Activity on Medicaid Heating Up Across the
Country, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/upclose-legislative-activity-medicaid-heating-up-across-country [https://perma.cc/3TGC-4PPK] (discussing
developments on Medicaid activity in six states).
27 See, e.g., Joe Lawlor, Maine Gov. Mills Rejects Work Requirements LePage Sought for Medicaid,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.pressherald.com/2019/01/22/mills-rejects-workrequirements-lepage-sought-for-medicaid-beneficiaries [https://perma.cc/P95J-8N4Y]; Catherine Shaffer,
New Data Show Benefits of Michigan’s Medicaid Expansion, MICH. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 9, 2018),
https://www.michiganradio.org/post/new-data-show-benefits-michigans-medicaid-expansion
[https://perma.cc/FVX6-J77U]; Medicaid Expansion Enrollment Increases to 400,635; Uninsured Rate
Drops, LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH (Feb. 16, 2017), https://ldh.la.gov/index.cfm/newsroom/detail/4169
[https://perma.cc/W9M6-P49W].
28 See Lindsay Whitehust, Utah Reduces Voter-Backed Medicaid Expansion in Rare Move, ASSOC.
PRESS (Feb. 11, 2019), https://apnews.com/49b24e08059e49b3b1685ff0cb450e5e [https://perma.cc/JAT6VD8Q]; Audrey Dutton, Idaho Supreme Court Upholds Medicaid Expansion, Rejects Idaho Freedom
Foundation
Suit,
IDAHO
STATESMAN
(Feb.
5,
2019,
4:54
PM),
https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article225578040.html
[https://perma.cc/EGX8-88YN]; Abby Goodnough, Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah Vote to Expand Medicaid,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/health/medicaid-expansion-ballot.html
[https://perma.cc/68VU-6G3N]; see also Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act
Entrenchment, 108 GEO. L.J. 495, 566–68 (2020) (discussing this activity in the states).
29 See Monica Prasad, American Exceptionalism and the Welfare State: The Revisionist Literature,
19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 187, 188 (2016) (relating that “in recent decades, several scholars have argued that
the American welfare state is not small after all; it is different”).
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scholars similarly disparage American welfare programs as an amalgamation
of race-baiting, misogyny, and anti-tax politics that accompanied the rise of
right-wing politics.30 Few would predict that two means-tested programs, beset
by myriad regulations and challenges inherent in federal and state
coordination, would represent some of the largest federal and state
expenditures in twenty-first-century America. Yet, we lack an account of how
and why SNAP and Medicaid have become so durable over the last half
century. To best understand how SNAP and Medicaid went from minimal
enterprises to massive endeavors in the space of a few decades, we must allow
for an important, if imperfect, role for law.31
In the process, this Article informs two scholarly debates. First, the
surprising strength of the country’s two largest anti-poverty programs enriches
our understanding of the relationship between procedure and substantive law.
This Article challenges the purportedly perverse relationship between
procedural protections and substantive rights, famously articulated by Justice
Black in his dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly and the Burger Court in its decision
in Mathews v. Eldridge.32 Second, the Article adds further evidence that those
interested in tracing these developments need to look beyond Congress to the
agencies and courts. By illuminating the more concrete issues of agency action
and public law litigation, accounting for the staying power of SNAP and
Medicaid illustrates how law is made in today’s administrative state.
This Article sets out to account for the continued durability of SNAP and
Medicaid in today’s administrative state. Part I traces the rise of American antipoverty programs, the genesis of Professor Charles Reich’s The New Property,
and the Supreme Court’s treatment of welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly
and beyond. This Part also outlines the New Property’s intellectual and
programmatic legacy and the doctrinal context for public law attorneys
attempting to litigate welfare rights today. Part II discusses the Trump
Administration’s current attacks on SNAP and Medicaid through legislative
and administrative action, paying particularly close attention to the controversy
over work requirements. Finally, Part III proposes updating the New Property
by putting forth a structural account recognizing that procedure not only raises
30 See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE (2008); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How
Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1163–68 (1995);
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers’ Work, 29 CONN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1994); Sylvia A. Law,
Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1264–66 (1983).
31 See generally Ira Katznelson, Rethinking the Silences of Social and Economic Policy, 101 POL. SCI.
Q. 307, 320, 323 (1986) (identifying “decentralization and federalism . . . a porous central bureaucracy . . .
[and] the importance of law and the judiciary” as key features of the American state).
32 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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the cost for state administrators to block social welfare program expansion, but
also raises the costs for participation in those programs. The Article concludes
by noting the persistent barriers to poor Americans seeking assistance, despite
the courts’ protection of their interests.
This Article does not intend to paint a rosy picture of welfare litigation.
Instead, the Article updates the insights of the New Property in light of the
maturation of medical and food assistance over the last fifty years. The
durability of anti-poverty assistance in the United States cannot be fully
explained without a thorough accounting of the legal infrastructure—the public
interest bar, state agencies, and federal courts—that buttresses these programs.
This account challenges shibboleths about public law litigation, procedural
protections, and substantive rights. By necessity, that project moves the New
Property away from its original premises that rights must be constitutional,
lawmaking must occur in Congress, and cases must be litigated up to the
Supreme Court. This Article seeks to build a theory to fit the world of welfare
we live in now.33 And in light of the ongoing cases in federal court, we need
that theory now more than ever.
I.

THE NEW PROPERTY, FIFTY YEARS ON

Before we can understand the New Property’s legacy, we must attend to
its creation. This Part synthesizes that origin story with the expansion of food
and medical assistance and the persistence of welfare litigation over the last
half century. It traces Supreme Court precedent regarding treating welfare
entitlements as property rights and concludes by setting up the next Part: a
comprehensive account of how SNAP and Medicaid have fared in the Trump
Administration. Indeed, the animating premise of this Article is that the Trump
Administration’s actions and the attendant litigation illustrate the New
Property’s enduring vitality. But to get there, we must know how the New
Property began.
A. The Beginnings of the New Property
For the first 150 years of the United States’ history, services to people in
need were designed, funded, and delivered by state governments,
municipalities, and charitable organizations, particularly religiously affiliated

33 See, e.g., Elise Bant & Matthew Harding, Introduction to EXPLORING PRIVATE LAW 3, 3 (Elise Bant
& Matthew Harding eds., 2010) (describing a legal scholar as someone who “must map what he sees from
the ground, feeling his way where he must as well as taking the bird’s eye view where he can” thereby “bring
order to the chaos, but not by turning away from the chaos, and not by refusing to bear the responsibility of
imposing order”).
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ones.34 While states and cities began building more systematic responses to the
newly perceived social problem of poverty at the turn of the twentieth century,
the federal government was largely absent from social welfare law until the
New Deal.35 However, beginning with the Social Security Act of 1935, the
federal government took on a far more active role in financing and overseeing
these state and local efforts.36 From that point forward, the federal government
managed an ever-growing social insurance apparatus that dispensed payments
to the elderly, dependents, and survivors of those beneficiaries, and, later,
workers with disabilities.37 For needy families, the Social Security Act
established the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, later renamed Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which increased the federal
funding of state-administered cash assistance programs on the condition of
some broad federal requirements.38 While scholars continue to contest the
purposes and pitfalls of New Deal programs, these programs represent some
34 For the classic surveys, see MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 3–35 (10th ed. 1996); WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO
WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 1–46 (6th ed. 1999). There are two new
histories of governmental responses to poverty in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America. See KRISTIN
O’BRASSILL-KULFAN, VAGRANTS AND VAGABONDS: POVERTY AND MOBILITY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (2019); HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR: ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES AND THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY (2017).
35 See MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 127–50 (2013) (exploring how federal responses to natural disasters
informed the New Deal generally and the Social Security Act in particular); JAMES T. PATTERSON,
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19–33 (2000) (discussing how the
Progressive Era built on this understanding); DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS
IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 235–66 (1998) (discussing American interest in European social protection schemes
at the turn of the twentieth century); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890–1935, at 253–99 (1994) (describing compromises and concessions made
by movement leaders to secure the passage of the Social Security Act); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING
SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 525–39 (1992) (arguing that the American welfare state predates the New Deal).
36 The Social Security Act of 1935 established and updated several federal and state programs, including
Aid to Dependent Children, the predecessor program to AFDC and TANF and what most people refer to as
“welfare” (Title IV). Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–81); see also Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 271–72 (Black, J., dissenting) (“In the last half century the United States, along with many,
perhaps most, other nations of the world, has moved far toward becoming a welfare state, that is, a nation
that for one reason or another taxes its most affluent people to help support, feed, clothe, and shelter its less
fortunate citizens.”).
37 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174–75 (1941) (suggesting that “the theory of the
Elizabethan poor laws no longer fit the facts” because “[r]ecent years, and particularly the past decade, have
been marked by a growing recognition that in an industrial society the task of providing assistance to the
needy has ceased to be local in character”).
38 See PATTERSON, supra note 35, at 65–70. Both Medicaid and the food stamp program were conceived
of as in-kind supplements of medical care and food assistance to AFDC recipients. See GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS § 2 (2008).
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of the federal government’s early anti-poverty initiatives and supervision of
state and local welfare efforts.39
The growth of federal expenditures and regulations for anti-poverty
programs accelerated when President Lyndon B. Johnson declared an
unconditional War on Poverty.40 Johnson’s national program served several
purposes. Johnson hoped to complete the work of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s New Deal, extend the gains of the Civil Rights movement from
political rights to social and economic rights, and broaden federal investment
and control across urban and rural areas of the country through a domestic
policy distinct from that of the slain President John F. Kennedy.41 The Johnson
Administration’s anti-poverty efforts, directed from the White House by the
newly created Office of Economic Opportunity, drew on and contributed to a
confidence in the federal government’s capacity to tackle national challenges.
This activity, spurred by the experiences of the New Deal, World War II, and
the Marshall Plan, fueled the growth of the federal bureaucracy.42 That
bureaucracy, in turn, confronted a federal judiciary that had to negotiate the
growth in administrative activity. In response, lawyers and activists in this
period drew on flourishing social movements, especially those advocating for
equal rights and fair treatment of Black Americans and women, to argue that
poor Americans deserved similar opportunity and justice in the United States.
39 See generally JEFFERSON COWIE, THE GREAT EXCEPTION: THE NEW DEAL & THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (2016); CYBELLE FOX, THREE WORLDS OF RELIEF: RACE, IMMIGRATION, AND THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO THE NEW DEAL (2012); IRA KATZNELSON,
FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013); CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL
OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004); EDWIN
AMENTA, BOLD RELIEF: INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN SOCIAL
POLICY (1998).
40 See Video: Lyndon Johnson’s First State of the Union—January 8, 1964 (UVA Miller
Center), https://web2.millercenter.org/speeches/video/mp4/1Mb/spe_1964_0108_johnson.mp4 (last visited
Sept. 28, 2020). Some historians have discussed the role of Michael Harrington’s The Other America,
published in 1962, and particularly its review in the New Yorker. See Dwight MacDonald, Our Invisible
Poor, NEW YORKER (Jan. 12, 1963), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1963/01/19/our-invisible-poor
[https://perma.cc/C3DX-57DW]; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN
THE WHITE HOUSE 1010 (rev. ed. 2002) (“The Other America helped crystallize [Kennedy’s] determination
in 1963 to accompany the tax cut by a poverty program.”). In a provocative challenge to this focus on
political elites and mass attitudes, Professor Alice O’Connor argues that researchers and philanthropy in the
1950s and 1960s narrowed the focus of “the poverty problem” by abandoning broader structural inquiries in
favor of a technocratic, behaviorist approach. ALICE O’CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE,
SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE POOR IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY U.S. HISTORY 284–95 (2001).
41 See JULIAN E. ZELIZER, THE FIERCE URGENCY OF NOW: LYNDON JOHNSON, CONGRESS, AND THE
BATTLE FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY 132–45 (2015).
42 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICA’S ENDURING CONFRONTATION WITH
POVERTY 104 (2d ed. 2013) (suggesting that three interpretations of the early years of the War on Poverty—
“the primacy of ideas and goodwill,” “the outcome of bureaucratic maneuvering,” and “a response to great
social and political forces”—are at least partially correct).
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This legalistic, public-spirited approach to addressing poverty manifested, in
part, through the federal funding of lawyers for poor Americans. Although the
Johnson Administration initially rejected such a proposal, the efforts of a few
well-connected advocates and the American Bar Association’s eventual
acquiescence led to the creation of federally funded legal services.43 These
lawyers immediately began to challenge state administration of welfare
programs in federal court.44 Importantly, the legal service lawyers sometimes
disagreed with the activist leaders in the welfare-rights movement, whose
leadership and rank-and-file members pushed the lawyers to challenge the
adequacy of the assistance itself.45 Rather than squarely litigating a
constitutional right to subsistence, the lawyers, taking a page from the
NAACP’s Southern strategy, attacked benefit terminations, residency
requirements, and privacy violations in the former Confederacy.46
As a result of that strategy, the first welfare case heard in the United States
Supreme Court was King v. Smith.47 Reuben King, Alabama Governor George
Wallace’s welfare administrator, oversaw a practice which directed welfare
caseworkers to terminate any family’s cash assistance if the caseworker
determined a man was living in the house.48 Known as the “substitute father”
rule, this practice, common across a swath of states, reflected racist views of
Black women’s sexuality, family status, and economic activity.49 States like
Alabama argued that the practice was lawful because federal law gave them
significant leeway to run their public benefits programs, despite the federal
government contributing significant portions of funding to states, including
83% of the funding to Alabama’s AFDC program. 50 The Supreme Court
43 See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–
1973, at 32–35 (1993); FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POVERTY AND POLITICS
IN MODERN AMERICA 69 (2007) (describing how the “legal resources available to welfare recipients changed
dramatically in the middle 1960s”).
44 See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 35–37.
45 See id. at 56–69 (detailing debates over litigation strategy among Welfare Rights organizations and
attorneys).
46 Id.
47 392 U.S. 309 (1968); DAVIS, supra note 43, at 4.
48 King, 392 U.S. at 313–14.
49 Suggestive of the newfound power of a network of anti-poverty lawyers, the legal services lawyer
who drafted the initial complaint in the King litigation modeled it on a complaint filed by the Center on
Social Welfare Policy and Law challenging Georgia’s “employable mother” practice. Each harvest season,
counties in rural Georgia terminated all AFDC recipients who had children over three years old to force
Black women to work for white farmers. See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 62; see also Ira C. Lupu, Welfare and
Federalism: AFDC Eligibility Policies and the Scope of State Discretion, 57 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3–11 (1977)
(discussing the background and implications of King).
50 See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 67; King, 392 U.S. at 314 (citing ALABAMA MANUAL FOR
ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, pt. I, ch. 2, § vi); see also id. at 317–18.
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disagreed, holding that Alabama’s policy violated the Social Security Act
because it added a condition of eligibility not contemplated by the federal
statute.51 In doing so, the Court struck down a state’s welfare policy for the first
time in the nation’s history. The role of federal law—and with it, the role of
federal courts—in welfare administration would never be the same after King.52
The following term, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Shapiro v.
Thompson, which presented three consolidated cases challenging welfare
residency laws in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania.
Each case involved a statutory provision imposing a one-year waiting period
before newly arrived residents could receive AFDC. Reargued the following
term, the case was ultimately decided in favor of the welfare recipients. In an
opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, the Court reasoned that
imposing a waiting period on welfare benefits violates a poor American’s
fundamental right to travel.53 Drawing on emerging equal protection
jurisprudence, the Court moved closer to suggesting that a state statute that
infringed on a fundamental right to welfare needed a “compelling interest” to
survive a Fourteenth Amendment challenge.54
While King and Shapiro wound their way through the federal courts, legal
aid lawyers also challenged the state procedures governing benefit
terminations. However, unlike King, which turned on the interpretation of the
Social Security Act, and Shapiro, which relied on existing constitutional
doctrine, this litigation demanded a novel legal theory that brought these
programs within the ambit of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the behest of some welfare experts who knew of his earlier
writing on invasive searches of welfare recipients’ homes, 55 Professor Charles
Reich agreed to research and reflect on the legal implications of welfare
administration. The result was The New Property, in which Professor Reich
argued that government itself was increasingly a source of newfound property
rights in its provision of entitlements like occupational licenses and welfare
benefits.56 At common law, land had provided that zone of personal autonomy,
51

Id. at 333.
Indeed, Professor Karen Tani has argued that there is a constitutional dimension to King, albeit below
the surface of the Court’s opinion. See Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 885–89 (2015).
53 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969).
54 Id. at 638.
55
Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963);
see also KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE,
1935–1972, at 263–66 (2016); DAVIS, supra note 43, at 81–86.
56 See Reich, supra note 12, at 787. Professor Reich’s article The New Property is one of the most wellknown works of legal scholarship. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most Cited Law Review
52
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but the “rootless twentieth century man” of Professor Reich’s time needed
“sanctuaries or enclaves” to provide protection from government changes in
policy from one administration to the next.57 Since “property performs the
function of maintaining independence . . . by creating zones” of independence
for the rights-holder, Professor Reich wrote that procedural protections could
provide “a valuable means for restraining arbitrary action” by the
government.58
The next term, the Supreme Court struck down New York’s termination
procedures, lending credence to Reich’s theory of the New Property, in
Goldberg v. Kelly.59 The Court reasoned that once the Social Security Act
created a statutory entitlement to assistance, the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited a deprivation of that new property interest without due process of
law. Notably, New York’s Social Services Commissioner had conceded that
the welfare benefits in question were “property” within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause.60 As a result, the Court, in another majority opinion by Justice
Brennan, moved past the threshold question of whether welfare benefits were
“property” and focused instead on what pretermination process was due.61 The
Court’s answer was a set of procedural protections, including requiring an inperson termination hearing to allow the recipient to confront the agency and its

Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 tbl.1 (2012) (listing Reich’s article as the seventh most
cited law review article ever); see also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (2000) (describing how the
1960s’ “legal-bureaucratic model [of welfare programs] emphasized the notion of entitlement” (citing Reich,
supra note 12)).
57 See Reich, supra note 12, at 787. Professor Reich was not the only legal academic theorizing about
welfare rights at the time. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term—Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 11–13 (1969); Bernard Evans
Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALB. L. REV. 210, 241–45 (1967); Harry W.
Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 154–55 (1958). And Professor
Jacobus tenBroek had been writing about these issues for decades until he passed away in 1968. See
JACOBUS TENBROEK, FAMILY LAW AND THE POOR: ESSAYS BY JACOBUS TENBROEK (Joel F. Handler ed.,
1971); see also Reich, supra note 12, at 786 n.233 (citing works by Professors tenBroek and Jones).
58 Reich, supra note 12, at 771, 783. While Professor Reich thought welfare benefits was one example
of this new property, another impetus for his analysis came from his apprehension about McCarthyism—in
particular, a case involving a New York doctor who refused to respond to a subpoena from the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC) and who eventually lost his medical license as a result. See Karen
M. Tani, Flemming v. Nestor: Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making of “New Property,”
26 LAW & HIST. REV. 379, 403–04 (2008).
59 See 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
60
The litigants could have used 28 U.S.C. § 1343 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 instead of claiming an implied
cause of action in the Constitution itself. Unlike the Justices who currently sit on the Supreme Court, the
Goldberg majority was apparently unconcerned from whence the cause of action arose.
61 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (1970) (“It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as
more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”).

375

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

witnesses before an “impartial decision maker” who would “state the reasons
for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on.”62
Justice Black dissented in Goldberg on several grounds. Most relevant for
this Article, Justice Black predicted that the additional procedures the Court
imposed on New York and other states would undermine the very recipients
the Court sought to protect.63 Justice Black’s reasoning foreshadowed the
perversity argument that has dogged the due process revolution64: he predicted
that the cost of increased procedural protections would discourage the political
branches from extending welfare benefits.65 Justice Black’s intuition about
subsequent decisions across the branches of government was intriguing, but
ultimately wrong, as this Article will explore.
Although Goldberg v. Kelly appeared to invite a revolution in the
substantive law of welfare programs and constitutional due process more
generally, such predictions proved premature.66 Within a week of handing
down Goldberg, the Court rejected a challenge to Maryland’s welfare grant
amount on equal protection grounds in Dandridge v. Williams.67 The lawyers
who brought Dandridge argued that by setting a maximum grant, regardless of
family size, Maryland denied equal treatment to families on the arbitrary basis
of household size.68 Courts and scholars have subsequently interpreted

62

Id. at 271.
Id. at 278–79 (Black, J., dissenting).
64 By “due process revolution,” I refer to federal court decisions in both the civil and criminal law
contexts in the 1960s and 1970s. Compare, e.g., Jason Parkin, Dialogic Due Process, 167 U. PA. L. REV.
1115, 1116–17 (2019) (arguing that “[a] series of Court decisions culminating in Goldberg v. Kelly greatly
expanded the scope of the Due Process Clause’s coverage, triggering an ‘explosion’ in due process litigation
that came to be known as the ‘due process revolution’”), with Sarah A. Seo, Democratic Policing Before the
Due Process Revolution, 128 YALE L.J. 1246, 1249 (2019) (describing the due process revolution’s
dominant narrative as concerning how “the Court broke new ground by extending federal procedural rights
to state criminal defendants in an effort to protect individuals, especially minorities and the poor, from the
police”). Professor Charles Reich is credited for inspiring the due process revolution. See Fred O. Smith, Jr.,
Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 599–600 (2014) (associating
the civil context of the due process revolution with Professor Reich); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process
Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1974 (1996) (“Charles Reich can be credited
with intellectual paternity for the due process revolution.”).
65 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 278–79 (Black, J., dissenting).
66 See Judith Resnik, The Story of Goldberg: Why This Case Is Our Shorthand, in CIVIL PROCEDURE
STORIES 473, 498 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (“In one respect, Goldberg v. Kelly lived a very
short life.”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at 161 (describing Goldberg as “an especially dramatic ruling”
because it “abandoned the right-privilege distinction and ruled that welfare was indeed a form of
constitutional ‘property’”).
67 397 U.S. 471, 485–87 (1970).
68 Id. at 466–77.
63
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Dandridge as the Supreme Court rejecting a right to basic assistance.69 While
some persuasively dispute that characterization,70 none challenge that
Dandridge represents the current limit of constitutional welfare litigation.
Six years later, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge abandoned the Goldberg
Court’s quest for trial-like procedures in administrative adjudication. Instead,
the Court in Mathews adopted a more flexible, multifactor test that balanced
the interest of the impacted individual, the expected value of additional
procedural safeguards, and the costs and burdens to the government to provide
those procedures.71 Importantly, the Court in Mathews tracked the reasoning of
Justice Black’s dissent in Goldberg, agonizing over how the political branches
would respond to court-ordered procedural protections for benefit recipients.72
While Dandridge and Mathews represent the confines of the Supreme Court’s
activity in this area of law, assistance to meet the needs of poor Americans has
become more firmly rooted than this limited doctrine might suggest.
B. The New Property Grows Up, 1964–2016
From the inception of the New Property to the election of the current
Administration, several scholars have questioned and built on the New
Property. First, by looking at the intellectual legacy of the New Property, this
Section discerns three principal camps of scholars, each offering insights about
the past and future of the New Property. Second, by looking at the origins and
growth of SNAP and Medicaid, one detects a vitality to these programs, despite
repeated efforts to dismantle them. This Section concludes by noting the
particular political barriers to SNAP and Medicaid’s growth and the programs’
dogged persistence in the face of proposed cuts, suggesting their importance
not only to those who use them, but also to state governments who cannot
afford to stand in their way.

See C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 191 (3d Cir. 1996); Baker v. City of
Concord, 916 F.2d 744, 755 (1st Cir. 1990); Susannah Camic Tahk, The New Welfare Rights, 83 BROOK. L.
REV. 875, 884 (2018) (describing “[t]he Court’s skepticism surrounding a ‘right to live’” as “what eventually
led to the demise of the welfare rights litigation movement”); Samuel Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to
Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study in the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 211, 228–29 (1973) (describing the issue in Dandridge as “the bridge to a constitutional right to
welfare,” but that “[t]he outcome of the case . . . came as a cruel and unexpected blow to the ‘right to life’
hopefuls”).
70 See Julie A. Nice, A Sweeping Refusal of Equal Protection: Dandridge v. Williams (1970), in THE
POVERTY LAW CANON 129, 129–52 (Ezra Rosser & Marie Failinger eds., 2016).
71 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976).
72 Id. at 348–49.
69
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1. The New Property’s Intellectual Legacy
While the Supreme Court backed away from Goldberg’s groundwork for
both a full-blown procedural revolution and a substantive right to welfare, The
New Property’s ideas live on. Although some have taken New Property into
fields outside of government services and benefits,73 of those who have
engaged with Professor Reich’s analysis in his original area of focus, most fall
into one of three camps. The first diagnoses the failure to constitutionalize a
right to welfare benefits. The second pragmatically focuses on pursuing the
same principles in new arenas, such as tax and employment law. Finally, some
see the steady, reliable growth of welfare benefits as a sign that the New
Property did take root, but in an unpredicted form.
The first and largest camp is made up of those who emphasize the
unfulfilled promise of the potentially transformative idea of constitutional
rights to social welfare benefits. Typically retrospective, this scholarship is
unsurprisingly the bailiwick of legal historians. However, these laments do not
always agree as to the cause of the New Property’s failure. In her book Brutal
Need, the still-definitive account of the beginnings of welfare rights, Professor
Martha Davis characterizes the efforts of lawyers and activists to build a
doctrine of constitutional welfare rights as incomplete, if not misguided.74
Lawyers enjoyed initial success in the Supreme Court striking down some state
practices, as explained above.75 Yet disagreements among the lawyers
themselves, as well as tensions between the attorneys and activists, including
the National Welfare Rights Organization, undermined what was ultimately an
unsuccessful court-centric effort as opposed to one that could nurture the social
movements crucial to fundamental change.76 Professor Cass Sunstein and
others have suggested that it was not a result of strategy or tactics on the part
of lawyers or their movement allies that the United States failed to
constitutionalize welfare rights; rather, the failure stemmed from a change in
the Supreme Court’s composition.77 According to this account, Richard
73 See, e.g., Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
1123, 1146 (1997); Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1668 (1993) (exploring how the concept could inform environmental impact statements).
74 See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 143–45 (1993) (concluding that the welfare-rights litigation strategy
was an “ultimate failure”); see also FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND
POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 185 (2007) (“The welfare rights era [has] ended . . . .”). But see Ed Sparer,
Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 561–63 (1984) (highlighting the energizing effect of
litigation on the welfare social movement).
75 See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311–13 (1968).
76 See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 133–41.
77 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at 153 (identifying the 1968 election as “[t]he crucial historical
development” because of Nixon’s “four Supreme Court appointments, which created a critical mass of
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Nixon’s election to the presidency and his success at putting four Justices on
the Supreme Court in his first term effectively shut the door to further
constitutional protections for poor people.78 Nevertheless, even though he
offers a different explanation from Davis’s, Sunstein concurs in the verdict that
it was a “revolution that wasn’t.”79 Professor Karen Tani has offered both a
more expansive and a more nuanced history of these developments, putting the
New Property in the context of a heterodox set of ideas and arguments swirling
around and inside the American welfare state.80 Notably, Professor Tani shows
how administrators (many of whom were not lawyers) were grappling with
forming a national welfare law long before Reich alighted on the topic.81 While
her history begins earlier and sweeps broader than the other accounts, Professor
Tani, too, sides with Davis, Sunstein, and the other members of this camp,
concluding that the New Property project failed to find anything more than a
foothold within the federal administrative apparatus and state bureaucracies.82
Professor Tani agrees that by the early 1970s, federal and state governments
were both considered “valid centers and hence valid administrators—allowing,
in effect, for unequal, nonuniform citizen experiences with authority” and
“capable of tolerating extraordinary levels of poverty and inequality.”83
The second camp includes scholars who, like the first, recognize the
failure of the New Property to lead to a transformation in public law, but look
for alternative avenues to expand legal protections for poor Americans. Their
projects are, at bottom, prospective and, as a result, are in conversation with
the lawyers litigating these cases. Some of these alternativists have argued that
new poverty law must revolve not around public benefits like cash assistance,
Medicaid, or SNAP, but rather low-wage work. As Professor Juliet Brodie has
written, after the failed constitutional project of the 1960s and 1970s and the
welfare-reform legislation of the 1990s, “The end of welfare entitlement meant
that many former welfare recipients must now rely on wage employment for a

justices willing to reject the claim that social and economic rights were part of the Constitution”); see also
id. at 162–63 (describing how the Court then “limited the reach of [decisions like Shapiro and Goldberg] . . .
and eventually made it clear that for the most part, social and economic rights have no constitutional status”).
But see R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 39 (1994) (pointing out
that despite naming no Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, President Carter successfully nominated 264
Article III judges—“more than any President until Reagan”).
78 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at 153.
79 Id.
80
TANI, supra note 55, at 212–14.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 280 (concluding that “the rule books have gotten thicker, but citizens are still dying, slowly and
unequally from, economic need”).
83 Id. at 279.
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larger percentage of their families’ income than in the AFDC era.”84 As a result,
the workplace, especially at the bottom of the labor market, “presents unique
and important legal issues” that demand “a new poverty law agenda.”85 Others
like Professors Susannah Tahk and Sara Greene have pointed to the prodigious
growth in anti-poverty tax expenditures and their concomitant procedural
protections to demonstrate newer federal anti-poverty efforts.86 This camp
insists that welfare rights should move on to more promising arenas, whether
in civil justice, employment law, tax law, or some other area.87
A small camp, perhaps best characterized as the contrarians, do not see
the New Property as a failure, but as still holding some promise. To paraphrase
Mark Twain, these contrarians would caution that reports of the New
Property’s death have been exaggerated.88 The contrarians maintain the focus
should not be on the expressive commitments of politicians or landmark
Supreme Court cases, but rather on the functional constraints placed on the
bureaucrats who administer these programs. These scholars see the steady
growth and routinization of public benefits, such as SNAP and Medicaid, as a

84 Juliet M. Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty Law
Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 201, 225 (2006); see id. (contrasting “an earlier era . . . dominated by
welfare policy, entitlements and constitutional protections” with a new era demanding that “lawyers
concerned about justice for the poor must contend with the post-welfare employment setting” (citing, inter
alia, Goldberg v. Kelly and Dandrige v. Williams as part of the earlier era)); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and
Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 381 (2012) (describing
PRWORA as “eliminating rights claims”); Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1138–40
(2006) (discussing the emphasis PRWORA placed on promoting work); cf. Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare
Requires from Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373, 380–88 (2006) (describing the need for a purposive account of
what qualifies as “work” under welfare work requirements); Alan W. Houseman, The Vitality of Goldberg
v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy in the 1990s, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 831, 859 (1990) (arguing a few years before
the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)
that “Goldberg is even more vital today than it was when issued in 1970”).
85 See Brodie, supra note 84, at 225.
86 See Susannah Camic Tahk, The New Welfare Rights, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 875, 898–916 (2018)
(characterizing tax law as replete with protections for low-income taxpayers in contrast with the decline in
welfare rights); Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 796–817 (2014)
(enumerating the anti-poverty programs administered through the tax code); Sara Sternberg Greene, The
Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 515, 560 (2013) (suggesting that “[i]n many regards, the [earned income tax credit (EITC)] is an
ideal federal antipoverty program” but that families who receive the EITC are still vulnerable to “financial
shocks”). But see Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax InJustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1173, 1186–87 (2013)
(discussing challenges low-income families face in accessing EITC); Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t
Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 287–89 (2010) (questioning the EITC’s effectiveness
at reducing poverty).
87 See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons from
Domestic and International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260 (2013).
88 Mark Twain said, “[T]he report of my death was an exaggeration.” Louis J. Budd, Mark Twain as an
American Icon, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MARK TWAIN 1, 7 (Forrest G. Robinson ed., 1995).

380

115:361 (2020)

Litigating Welfare Rights

sign of the New Property’s staying power.89 These scholars are not apologists
for the current regime. Indeed, they often are its most vociferous critics.90 But
their criticisms do not suggest that the New Property project is
misapprehended, just misapplied.91 What these scholars share is a skepticism
that the standard by which the New Property should be judged is not whether
it has adherents on the Supreme Court or in Congress, but whether poor people
can use the New Property to make claims through agencies and courts.92
There are worthy insights in each of these approaches. First, not only do
the historical accounts serve to ground doctrinal developments in the social
movements of the last century, but they also chasten those who may expect
courts to lead in this area of law. The alternativist approach warns lawyers from
becoming too enamored with a golden age, which, whether it was as bright as
hindsight suggests, is undeniably past.93 The alternativist mode challenges
lawyers to go where poor people and organizations are, rather than where they
might have once been. The contrarians, like the alternativists, pull attorneys
away from the past to confront contemporary challenges, without abandoning
welfare programs—the traditional site of the New Property—altogether. The
89 See, e.g., David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program
in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1285–86 (2004) (explaining that anti-hunger
advocates “saved what in many respects is the best-designed means-tested program in the United States”
with its “uniform benefit structure” and entitlement financing); Diller, supra note 56, at 1163–64 (2000)
(describing the impact of discretion-based welfare administration on the changing relationship between
caseworkers and program recipients); MELNICK, supra note 77, at 17.
90 See Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 317, 357–66 (2014) (arguing that social welfare policy can impose punitive consequences); see
also Diller, supra note 56, at 1128 (asserting that the “lack of accountability and potential for unfairness in
the new administrative regime are causes for concern”).
91 See Super, supra note 89, at 1282 (cautioning that “the common practice of studying cash-assistance
policy almost exclusively is likely to yield a severely distorted picture of public-benefits law”).
92 This legal scholarship dovetails with similar lines of inquiry in the social sciences. See JOE SOSS,
RICHARD C. FORDING & SANFORD F. SCHRAM, DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM AND
THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE 293–308 (2011); Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social
Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3, 12 (1984) (arguing that managerial reforms to the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program have reduced workers’ discretion and their ability to respond to recipients
in need); cf. Diller, supra note 56, at 1137 (discussing the move from the “social work” model of the 1930s
to the legal–bureaucratic model that emerged by the 1970s). Importantly, Professor Karen Tani has
synthesized these insights by highlighting bureaucratic disentitlement and the problems of administration
without losing sight of the federal courts. See TANI, supra note 55, at 279–82.
93 The experience of material deprivation in the United States looks different than it did more than half
a century ago. The experience of poverty in America is dissimilar from that of the country during the War
on Poverty. See AEI/BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON POVERTY & OPPORTUNITY, OPPORTUNITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND SECURITY: A CONSENSUS PLAN FOR REDUCING POVERTY AND RESTORING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 16–29 (2015) (discussing how poverty and economic opportunity in America have
changed since the 1960s); see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights
on His Mission to the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/33/Add.1, at 8–9 (2018).
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contrarians teach us that simply because the American constitutional system
currently fails to guarantee minimal entitlements does not mean that American
public law does not. And as a functional matter, the source of the right may not
matter to the person receiving assistance. Together, scholars from these three
camps delineate the New Property’s legacy and potential in light of antipoverty programs’ current challenges.
2. New Property’s Programmatic Legacy: Medicaid and SNAP
More Americans receive medical and food assistance from government
sources than ever before. Yet, the omnipresence of these two government
programs was neither predicted nor preordained. When Congress passed the
Social Security Amendments of 1965—commonly known as the Medicare
Act—it tacked on a caboose to that contributory program’s train and called it
Medicaid.94 Congress did not envision that the program would pay for nearly
half the births in the country,95 nor become a potential vehicle for universal
health coverage.96 Similarly, the year before creating Medicaid, Congress made
the funding of the food stamp program permanent, and a decade later Congress
extended that program nationwide.97 When Congress nationalized the food
stamp program, few politicians on Capitol Hill, federal or state bureaucrats, or
activists and lawyers working in and through the welfare-rights movement
thought that Congress had created a statutory right to food assistance. And yet,
over the last half century, fuzzy but firm rights to food and medical assistance
have taken root in the United States.98

94 See DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY 19–40 (2d ed. 2015)
(discussing Medicaid’s origins as both an “afterthought” for the Johnson Administration and members of
Congress, but also as a “sleeping giant” championed by then-House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur
Mills).
95 See Anne Rossier Markus, Ellie Andres, Kristina D. West, Nicole Garro & Cynthia Pellegrini,
Medicaid Covered Births, 2008 Through 2010, in the Context of the Implementation of Health Reform,
23 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e273, e276 tbl.2 (2013).
96 State Public Option Act, S. 489, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (permitting individuals not eligible for
Medicaid to buy into a state Medicaid plan); State Public Option Act, H.R. 1277, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019)
(same); see also, e.g., FRANK J. THOMPSON, MEDICAID POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POLICY DURABILITY, AND
HEALTH REFORM 2 (2012) (describing Medicaid as “initially seen by many as a poor second cousin to
Medicare” but noting that the program now “covers more people than Medicare” and “has become a pivotal
component of the epic health reform law of 2010”); Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform,
in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET 197, 211 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (describing Medicaid as having “achieved a
hidden, near universality”); Lindsay F. Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer Health Care,
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 843, 896 (2018) (describing the Affordable Care Act’s reliance on Medicaid to get to
universal coverage).
97 See Amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. 91-671, 84 Stat. 2048 (1971).
98 This is not the first article to assess the half-century legacy of public interest litigation on behalf of
poor Americans. Two accounts have had particular influence on this project. See Jason Parkin, Aging
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Medicaid has seen significant expansion in the last fifty-five years.
Medicaid is a program jointly administered by the federal and state
governments to assist states in furnishing medical assistance to needy
individuals and families.99 Anyone who qualifies under program rules can
receive Medicaid.100 Although states administer Medicaid, the federal
government determines the financial eligibility criteria for participants, and
state statutes and regulations must comply with certain broad federal
requirements.101 As for financing Medicaid benefits, there is a fairly technical
formula, called the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), that is
calculated for each state and varies by population and covered services.102 A
state’s FMAP ranges from 50% to 83%, with poorer states receiving more in
federal funding.103 Notably, for the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid, the statute
set the federal contribution at 100% and decreased it only to 90% in 2020 and
subsequent years.104 In addition to contributing less than half the benefit costs
of Medicaid, states also contribute roughly half of the costs to administer the
program.105 Despite Medicaid expenditures making up both the largest source
of federal funding to states and one of the largest budget items of state
spending, federal courts have repeatedly held that states cannot claim that their
own budgetary needs prevent them from complying with Medicaid’s
requirements.106 To administer Medicaid, states must cover “mandatory”
populations of people whose income falls below a means test tied to the federal
Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional Reform Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 167, 189–92 (2017);
Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2056 (2008).
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1; see also, e.g., Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 433 (2004) (“State
participation [in Medicaid] is voluntary; but once a State elects to join the program, it must administer a
state plan that meets federal requirements.”); Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098, 1102
(9th Cir. 2010); Miller v. Gorski Wladyslaw Est., 547 F.3d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 2008). According to the 2016
Actuarial Report on the Financial Outlook for Medicaid, overall Medicaid spending for FY2016 was $575.9
billion, with federal expenditures of $363.4 billion and state expenditures of $212.5 billion. CHRISTOPHER
J. TRUFFER, CHRISTIAN J. WOLFE & KATHRYN E. RENNIE, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2016 ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL
OUTLOOK FOR MEDICAID, at iv (2016).
100 Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36–37 (1981) (interpreting the Medicaid Act such that
“[a]n individual is entitled to Medicaid if he fulfills the criteria established by the State in which he lives”).
101 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a).
102 ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43847, MEDICAID’S FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
PERCENTAGE (FMAP) 1–2 (2018).
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b); see also Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures,
83 Fed. Reg. 61,157, 61,159 tbl.1 (Nov. 28, 2018) (listing effective quarterly FMAP rates); MITCHELL, supra
note 102, at 12–13 tbl.A-1 (listing FMAP rates from the last five fiscal years for the fifty states and D.C.).
104 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396d(y)(1); MITCHELL, supra note 102, at 8 tbl.1.
105 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(7).
106 See, e.g., Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir. 1999); Tallahassee Mem’l
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693, 704 (11th Cir. 1997).
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poverty guidelines, including children, parents, pregnant women, people with
disabilities, and senior citizens.107 For these populations, a state’s Medicaid
program must provide certain mandatory services.108 States may also receive
federal matching funds to extend coverage to optional populations, including
those listed above whose incomes fall slightly above the means test and those
who are considered “medically needy” people, as well as additional federal
funding for optional services.109
FIGURE 1: PERCENT OF U.S. POPULATION ENROLLED IN SNAP, 1969–2019110
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42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)–(m). So far, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have, under the
Affordable Care Act, expanded Medicaid to parents and childless adults up to 138% FPL. Status of State
Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 1, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/
[https://perma.cc/KL6T-ZVFC]. The Supreme Court held in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius that the federal government could not require states to expand Medicaid, rendering the provision
optional. 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).
108 These services include everything from hospital services to vaccines for children to pregnancyrelated services to rural health-clinic services. For a full list, see BARBARA S. KLEES, CHRISTIAN J. WOLFE
& CATHERINE A. CURTIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE &
MEDICAID 28 (2016), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/MedicareProgramRatesStats/Downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
T76F-RZ9D].
109 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.831(d) (2019); KLEES ET AL., supra note 108, at 28–29.
110 Data were compiled from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Census Bureau. See U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND COSTS (2020),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/SNAPsummary-7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
BP8U-5PZN]; National Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010–2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-national-total.html
[https://perma.cc/D4NY-ZN7U].
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FIGURE 2: PERCENT OF U.S. POPULATION ENROLLED IN MEDICAID, 1966–2017111
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SNAP has likewise grown dramatically since its inception. While federal
nutrition assistance dates back to the New Deal, the modern SNAP program
originated in 1964 and, through a flurry of congressional activity and federal
litigation, expanded repeatedly.112 Through a series of revisions to the Food
Stamp Act from 1970 to 1996, Congress expanded and standardized federal
food assistance. The 1970 amendments required that the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare create national standards for eligibility and increase
federal spending.113 The 1977 amendments made far more Americans eligible,
in part by no longer requiring households to pay for food stamps. At the same
time, Congress grew concerned with the ways in which federal courts were
interpreting the statute.114
Today, SNAP provides food-purchasing assistance to low-income
individuals and families.115 Like Medicaid, SNAP benefits are considered an
entitlement—meaning that a state needs to cover every eligible household that
applies for the benefit. Similar to Medicaid, federal law lays out SNAP
eligibility rules and benefit amounts. To qualify for benefits, a SNAP
household’s income must be at or below 130% of the federal poverty level
111 Data were compiled from the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission. See MEDICAID
& CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP DATA BOOK 25 (2018),
https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/December-2018-MACStats-Data-Book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LUK-ENPL].
112
MELNICK, supra note 77, at 183–84 (charting the “precipitous rise in spending” from fiscal years
1965 to 1992).
113 Amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 91-671, § 4, 84 Stat. 2048, 2049 (1971).
114 See MELNICK, supra note 77, at 207–30.
115 7 U.S.C. § 2013.
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(FPL),116 the household’s net monthly income (after deductions for expenses
like housing and child care) must be less than or equal to 100% FPL, and its
assets must fall below limits identified in the federal regulations.117 Households
with no net income receive the maximum amount per month ($509 for a family
of three), but the average monthly benefit is far lower ($378 for a family of
three).118 The average monthly benefit per person is $134 a month or $1.49 per
meal.119 SNAP benefits are provided on a “household” basis.120 In federal law,
a SNAP “household” means “an individual who lives alone or who, while
living with others, customarily purchases food and prepares meals for home
consumption separate and apart from the others; or a group of individuals who
live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for
home consumption.”121 SNAP households may use the benefit to purchase food
at one of the quarter-million retailers authorized by the Food and Nutrition
Service (FNS) to participate in the program.122 However, SNAP households
cannot use their benefits to purchase other necessary household items, like
sanitary products, or to purchase hot foods prepared at the retailer.123
Congress spared SNAP and Medicaid from the block grant changes of the
1996 Welfare Reform Act, and consequently, federal law continues to require
that states enroll any household that meets the eligibility criteria laid out in
statute. As a result, during economic downturns, especially in ones as severe
as the 2008 recession or the COVID-19 pandemic, SNAP rolls will expand.
States also have fiscal incentives to increase SNAP enrollment, as benefits are
100% federally funded. While administrative costs are split between the
federal and state governments, every dollar of SNAP benefits spent goes to
grocery stores and retailers in that state or region. As we will see in the next
Section, the fact that public-benefits administration is bound up in federal–state

116

This requirement does not apply to households with an elderly or disabled member. Id. § 2014(c)(2)
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A QUICK GUIDE TO SNAP ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS 1–4
(2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/a-quick-guide-to-snap-eligibility-and-benefits [https://perma.cc/
QU2K-JKWM]. In fiscal year 2020, the resource limits are $2,250 for households without an elderly or
disabled member and $3,500 for those with an elderly or disabled member. Id. at 1.
118 Id. at 3 & tbl.1.
119 Id. The average meal figure was calculated by dividing $134 by ninety meals, or three meals per
day.
120 7 U.S.C § 2014(a).
121 Id. § 2012(n)(1)(A)–(B).
122 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SNAP RETAILER DATA, FISCAL YEAR 2016 AT A GLANCE 1 (2016),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/2016-SNAP-Retailer-Management-Year-EndSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V4R-9VZD] (“As of September 30, 2016, 260,115 firms were authorized
to participate in SNAP.”).
123 See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(k); see also id. § 2013(a) (“The benefits so received by such households shall
be used only to purchase food from retail food stores which have been approved for participation in the
supplemental nutrition assistance program.”).
117
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relations in the United States, in turn, helps to explain the judicial flavor of this
area of public law.
C. Litigating the New Property
As we can see from Supreme Court precedent and current efforts by
public interest attorneys, public law litigation serves a particularly important
role in the enforcement of welfare as a property right against federal and state
cuts. Therefore, it is similarly important to understand the procedural hurdles
over which public law attorneys must vault to bring these lawsuits. In many
areas of American law, litigation plays a larger role in lawmaking relative to
the development of public law in other wealthy democracies. Public-benefits
administration is a leading example of this distinctive characteristic of the
American administrative state. Because states operate Medicaid and SNAP
within the confines of federal law, federal courts offer a national forum in
which individual recipients can enforce their rights under federal law against
the states.124
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge was
skeptical of the federal judiciary’s ability to require procedural protections in
welfare administration.125 The Mathews Court assumed that government faces
an inevitable procedure–substance trade-off in welfare benefits.126 Writing for
the Court in Mathews, Justice Lewis Powell suggested that procedural
protections and the substance of the benefit would necessarily come from the
same funding source. The Court reasoned that if the judiciary mandated more
procedure for welfare recipients, the political branches would fund those
procedures at the expense of the benefits themselves.127 In fact, the federal
government has not cut substantive benefits to provide procedural protections.
124 See, e.g., Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1398 (2013) (concluding state law violated
the Medicaid Act and was therefore preempted); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 283–85 (1971)
(interpreting the Social Security Act to allow beneficiaries to bring preemption actions to enjoin state laws
that conflict with federal law).
125 See supra Section I.A.
126 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (reasoning that “the cost of protecting those whom
the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come
out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any particular program of social welfare are
not unlimited”).
127 See id. (“[T]he Government’s interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and
administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed.”). Justice Black had a slightly different prediction
in Goldberg: that government would be disinclined to enroll individuals in public benefit programs if they
knew that procedural rights would attach upon enrollment. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 279 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting) (warning that “[w]hile this Court will perhaps have insured that no needy person will
be taken off the rolls without a full ‘due process’ proceeding, it will also have insured that many will never
get on the rolls, or at least that they will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to
determine initial eligibility”).
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Instead, it is the ideological state actors who attempt to limit or restrict access
to welfare by imposing procedural requirements, even though they must
swallow that cost themselves and even though it reduces the flow of federal
funding to their citizens and state. Public interest lawyers then must challenge
these requirements in federal court for violation of the federal statutory
requirements. In those cases, private litigants can rely on federal courts to
enforce national standards against the states.
For SNAP, the federal government pays for 100% of the substantive
benefit. States have to pay for up to half the administrative costs of the SNAP
program.128 That means that while states have to contribute to the
administration (including the procedures of the program), SNAP’s substantive
benefits are free to the states.129 While states do contribute to the cost of
Medicaid benefits, the federal government pays the lion’s share, and in the
Affordable Care Act, the most recent expansion of Medicaid was intended to
be free to states. As one might expect when the substance of the benefit is free,
but the procedures surrounding the benefit are not, states have historically been
reluctant to impose procedural barriers for which the state must pay to prevent
its residents from accessing benefits for which the state does not pay. As a
result, there is an improbable alliance between welfare recipients and their
advocates, on the one hand, who threaten to challenge procedural barriers, and
state bureaucrats, on the other, who are willing to undo procedural barriers or
refrain from erecting new ones. Both advocates and administrators’ interests
converge on keeping the benefits flowing to the recipients and the state. This
political economy story has more explanatory power because SNAP and
Medicaid are benefits that rely on third parties. SNAP benefits must be
accessed through SNAP-participating retailers, and Medicaid is an insurance
program that contributes to many hospitals’ and health care providers’ bottom
lines.130
By permitting claimants to bring a cause of action under the Due Process
Clause and federal statutes against state welfare administrators, the Supreme
Court in King, Shapiro, and Goldberg invited federal and state courts to
entertain the claims of individuals accessing SNAP and Medicaid. And perhaps
because of the incomplete nature of Supreme Court doctrine in this area, lower
courts knew that these welfare cases were unlikely to be taken up by the highest
court.131 This “new judicial terrain” was not lost on the attorneys challenging
128

7 U.S.C. § 2025(a).
See id. §§ 2013(a), 2019, 2025(a); 7 C.F.R. §§ 277.1(b), 277.4(b) (2019).
130 See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 278.2; 42 C.F.R. § 482.1(a)(3) (2019).
131 The Supreme Court did not review the D.C. Circuit’s decision that the Food Stamp Act created a
right to an adequate diet, but the Court might have reviewed the decision had the D.C. Circuit interpreted
129
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state welfare practices who began “stressing statutory rather than constitutional
arguments” and focused on “winning a string of cases in the lower courts
[rather] than one big case in the Supreme Court.”132
To this day, federal and state courts regularly invoke Goldberg for the
proposition that welfare recipients have a statutorily created property interest
significant enough to warrant the Constitution’s due process protections.133
Medicaid and SNAP recipients have procedural rights under the Constitution
and federal statutes to administrative hearings and meaningful notice when
their claims for assistance are denied or unreasonably delayed.134 As a result,
welfare recipients can use the Goldberg legacy to challenge various state
practices, albeit often relying on federal statutes rather than the Constitution
itself. For instance, SNAP recipients have sued for timely processing of their
applications for monthly benefits, expedited SNAP, and Disaster SNAP.135
Medicaid recipients have successfully challenged fair hearing procedures.136
the Constitution as creating the same. See MELNICK, supra note 77, at 205–11 (discussing Rodway v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
132 See id. at 40. This is not to say that SNAP and Medicaid recipients always win in federal court. See,
e.g., Toney-Dick v. Doar, No. 12 Civ. 9162(KBF), 2013 WL 6057949, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2013)
(granting the federal government’s motion to dismiss claims of discrimination brought by Disaster SNAP
recipients after Hurricane Sandy); McGee v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Hum. Servs., 398 P.3d 245, 247
(Mont. 2017) (accepting state agency’s position); Ennis v. N.D. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 820 N.W.2d 714, 718
(N.D. 2012) (same).
133 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that
“[p]laintiffs also have an overarching property interest in their continued receipt of food stamps, Medicaid
and cash assistance” (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–66 (1970))), modified in part 43 F. Supp.
2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. 2012) (“There is no question that
these entitlement benefits [Medicaid, SNAP, and TANF] are ‘property’ entitled to the full panoply of due
process protections.” (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261–62)).
134 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (requiring states to “provide for granting
an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance
under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness”); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200–250
(2019); see also Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 560–62 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that Medicaid applicants
received inadequate notice and were denied meaningful hearings in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a fair hearing before the state terminates Medicaid assistance);
Holman v. Block, 823 F.2d 56, 57 (4th Cir. 1987) (“[A] household currently receiving benefits has the right
to an administrative hearing before an action may be taken that adversely affects its participation in the Food
Stamp Program.”); Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 292–93, 326 (D.D.C. 1996)
(interruptions in Medicaid benefits without notice violated the Due Process Clause, federal statutes, and
Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations).
135 Class Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Miami Workers Ctr. v. Carroll,
No. 17-cv-24047 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2017) (suing on behalf of Hurricane Irma survivors with disabilities who
had been or would be excluded from participation in Florida’s D-SNAP program).
136 Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 263 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the Medicaid Act “creates a
right—enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—to have Medicaid fair hearings held, and fair hearing decisions
issued, within the regulation’s specified time frame”).
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SNAP recipients have challenged the implementation of the statutory time
limit for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs).137 Recipients
have challenged the privatization of welfare administration.138 They have
attacked state statutes penalizing recipients who have criminal records, secured
relief for HIV-positive welfare recipients, and challenged states’ failures to
accommodate recipients who have disabilities.139 Indeed, these lawsuits duck
many of the procedural and doctrinal obstacles that have made federal
litigation so challenging for other marginalized groups.140 As discussed below,
lawyers litigating to defend SNAP and Medicaid still can rely on private
enforcement of federal statutes, obtain class certification, and secure injunctive
relief.
1. Private Enforcement of Federal Law
Even though 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes lawsuits to enforce federal
statutes against state officials,141 simply because a federal statute creates a right
does not mean individuals can enforce those rights in court. The Supreme
Court has instructed that § 1983 “does not provide an avenue for relief every
time a state actor violates a federal law.”142 Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate

137

See Brooks v. Roberts, 251 F. Supp. 3d 401, 436–37 (N.D.N.Y. 2017); Order Setting Objections
Deadline & Hearing, Hatten-Gonzales v. Earnest, No. 88-0385 KG/CG (D.N.M. Feb. 5, 2018), ECF No.
811 (appointing a special master to help the state comply with the court’s orders); Order & Reasons, Romain
v. Sonnier, No. 15-06942 (E.D. La. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 23.
138 See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE,
AND PUNISH THE POOR 39–83 (2017) (detailing the bureaucratic mess and political fallout from Indiana’s
efforts to privatize its welfare benefits system by contracting with IBM); see also Class Action Complaint
at 1, Gemmell v. Affigne, No. 16-cv-00650 (D.R.I. Dec. 8, 2016) (challenging Rhode Island’s widespread
failure to process SNAP applications in a timely manner, in part due to the implementation of a faulty new
computer system). After filing the lawsuit, the plaintiff class settled with the Rhode Island Department of
Human Services. See Stipulation & Order of Settlement at 2, Gemmell v. Affigne, No. 16-cv-00650 (D.R.I.
Feb. 24, 2017).
139 Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Henrietta D. v.
Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) (regarding HIV-positive welfare recipients); see also Complaint at
1, R.H. v. Rawlings, No. 17-cv-01434 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 2017) (federal lawsuit on behalf of three lowincome residents with disabilities alleging that the Georgia SNAP and Medicaid agencies systematically
failed to accommodate the disabilities of vulnerable applicants and recipients); Raymond v. Rowland,
220 F.R.D. 173, 181 (D. Conn. 2004) (certifying class of welfare recipients with disabilities). This is not to
suggest that all SNAP litigation involves recipients. There is a gaggle of federal cases brought by grocers
and convenience stores seeking review of the Food and Nutrition Service’s decisions to disqualify them as
SNAP-approved retailers—almost always unsuccessfully. See, e.g., Irobe v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 890 F.3d
371, 382 (1st Cir. 2018); SS Grocery, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 340 F. Supp. 3d 172, 186 (E.D.N.Y.
2018); Alhalemi, Inc. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 3d 587, 594 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
140 For a sustained critique of these trends, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE
DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017).
141 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
142 City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119 (2005).
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that the underlying statute creates enforceable “rights” and “not the broader or
vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may be enforced under” the statute.143
Many have bemoaned the increasingly restrictive approach federal courts have
taken to finding a federal statute enforceable in federal court, absent an explicit
grant.144 Neither SNAP nor Medicaid has an explicit statutory provision
authorizing private enforcement, leaving § 1983 as the chief vehicle for
vindicating these claims in federal court. But should federal courts consider
SNAP and Medicaid as creating rights enforceable through § 1983?
To answer that question, federal courts must navigate among various
Supreme Court precedents, including Blessing v. Freestone and Gonzaga v.
Doe. In Blessing, the Supreme Court laid out the test to make such a
determination: (1) “Congress must have intended that the provision in question
benefit the plaintiff”; (2) the right “is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence”; and (3) “the statute must
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.”145 If satisfied, this
three-part inquiry creates a rebuttable presumption that the statute is privately
enforceable under § 1983.146 This presumption can be overcome if Congress
precluded private enforcement either “expressly” or “impliedly, by creating a
comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual
enforcement under § 1983.”147
Yet, finding an implied cause of action has not been fatal to welfare
recipients’ efforts to enforce federal requirements in either program, with the
notable exception of Medicaid’s equal access provision.148 In Briggs v. Bremby,
the Second Circuit held that “[u]nlike the [FERPA] funding provision involved
in Gonzaga,” the Food Stamp Act’s timely processing provisions “conferred
individual rights upon food stamp applicants in clear and unambiguous terms”
because the statute “contain[s] language that is focused on the interests of the
applicant households and calibrated to their economic needs” and thereby
satisfies Blessing’s first prong.149 As for the other two components of the
Blessing test, the Food Stamp Act, the Second Circuit pointed out, “create[s] a
specific requirement that must be followed for every food stamp applicant,
rather than a generalized ‘policy or practice,’” or one that “merely direct[s] the
143 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276, 283 (2002) (holding that a provision of Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) did not create an enforceable right under § 1983).
144 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 101–03.
145 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997).
146
Id. at 341.
147 Id.
148 Harris v. Olszewksi, 442 F.3d 456, 459–65 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that Medicaid’s “freedom-ofchoice provision” creates a privately enforceable right).
149 Briggs v. Bremby, 792 F.3d 239, 244–45 (2d Cir. 2015).
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distribution of funds.”150 Once the Second Circuit accepted the presumption
that the Food Stamp Act is enforceable under § 1983, the court further rejected
Connecticut’s attempt to rebut the presumption. Connecticut argued that since
the Food Stamp Act “empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to investigate
State noncompliance, withhold federal funds, and refer a noncompliant State
to the Attorney General to seek an injunction” that the statute bars “parallel
enforcement by individuals in federal and state courts.”151 The Second Circuit
rejected the State’s argument, reasoning that “[i]n stark contrast with FERPA
[the statute at issue in Gonzaga], however, the Food Stamp Act contains no
similar agency adjudication process or enforcement structure that could take
the place of private lawsuits.”152
On the other hand, the Supreme Court recently took a restrictive approach
to finding a private cause of action in a Medicaid case that could portend a
forbidding future for welfare litigation. In Armstrong v. Exceptional Child
Center, Inc., health care providers sued Idaho on the grounds that the State’s
reimbursement rates were so low that they violated the Medicaid statute’s
provision guaranteeing that a state’s rates “are consistent with efficiency,
economy, and quality of care.”153 The Supreme Court rejected that challenge,
holding that the Medicaid Act’s requirement for adequate reimbursement rates
does not create a private cause of action, via the Supremacy Clause, to
invalidate state-provider payment policies.154 Writing for the Court, Justice
Antonin Scalia reasoned that “[t]he sheer complexity associated with enforcing
§ 30(A), coupled with the express provision of an administrative remedy,
§ 1396c, shows that the Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement of
§ 30(A) in the courts.”155 The circuits are split as to whether Armstrong is
limited to federal statutory provisions that foreclose private enforcement in a
cause of action in equity or if Armstrong extends to a case brought under
§ 1983.156
150

Id.
Id. at 245 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g)).
152 Id. The Eighth Circuit has suggested that “[i]t is now settled that nothing ‘short of an unambiguously
conferred right’ will support a cause of action under § 1983.” Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002)).
153 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A).
154 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015).
155 Id. (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1396c).
156 Compare, e.g., Does, 867 F.3d at 1040 (concluding that § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act can no longer
proceed under § 1983, because the Court’s later decision in Armstrong “plainly repudiate[s] the ready
implication of a § 1983 action that Wilder exemplified” (quoting Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1386 n.*)), with
Legacy Cmty. Health Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 881 F.3d 358, 372 (5th Cir. 2018) (rejecting that reading of
Armstrong precisely because it “would likely overrule cases such as Wilder in which the Court found other
provisions of the Medicaid Act to be enforceable by health care providers through § 1983” (citation
151
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Along with the question of whether any individual can enforce a statutory
right for welfare benefits, there is the related question of whether individuals
have standing to enforce that right. Derived from Article III’s case-orcontroversy requirement, standing demands that a “plaintiff must have suffered
or be imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’
that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”157 A plaintiff must demonstrate
standing for each claim and each form of relief sought.158 Federal courts have
found that welfare recipients do have standing to challenge wrongful
terminations and denials of benefits.159 Indeed, perhaps because of the
pecuniary nature of benefits, the injury is quintessentially concrete and
redressable.160 Put together, these questions, one resolved and the other unclear,
pose obstacles for public law attorneys litigating these issues that must remain
top of mind for the success of any suit.

omitted)), revised (Feb. 1, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 211 (2018), and BT Bourbonnais Care, LLC v.
Norwood, 866 F.3d 815, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying Blessing’s three-factor test and noting that
“nothing in Armstrong, Gonzaga, or any other case we have found supports the idea that plaintiffs are now
flatly forbidden in section 1983 actions to rely on a statute passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause
powers”). The Second Circuit has distinguished Armstrong from a case involving federal law intended to
benefit foster parents. N.Y. State Citizens’ Coal. for Child. v. Poole, 922 F.3d 69, 85 (2d Cir. 2019).
157 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (citing Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). But see James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable Interests, and
Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 182–88 (2018) (suggesting that such
an interpretation of Article III conflicts with historical practice in the early years of the federal courts).
158 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Env’t
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). And the Supreme Court has interpreted Article III as
“demand[ing] that an ‘actual controversy’ persist throughout all stages of litigation.” Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
159 See, e.g., Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing how standing is
“easily established for their claim challenging the [Arkansas Medicaid waiver] as a whole”); N.B. ex rel.
Peacock v. District of Columbia, 682 F.3d 77, 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (concluding that plaintiffs had
standing to enforce procedural rights to adequate notices where the alleged violations threatened their ability
to obtain prescription medications under Medicaid).
160 See, e.g., Peña Martínez v. Azar, 376 F. Supp. 3d. 191, 200 (D.P.R. 2019) (“Plaintiffs have standing
to raise their claims because they have adequately alleged that they would be entitled to receive greater
benefits under SNAP than they currently do under NAP [Puerto Rico’s food assistance program].” (citing
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61)); Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 252 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that
Medicaid recipients have standing because they would be required to pay increased premiums); see also
Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (“[T]he presence of one party with
standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”).
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2. Class Actions and Injunctive Relief
Federal courts have become increasingly hostile to class actions, one of
the primary vehicles for welfare-rights litigation.161 However, even in this
climate for aggregate litigation, classes of welfare recipients are often immune
or, at least, resistant. To be certified in federal court, a class of plaintiffs must
convince the federal district court that first, “the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable”; second, “there are questions of law
or fact common to the class”; third, the “claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class”; and
fourth, “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.”162 The first requirement, numerosity, is easily met in
welfare litigation, as the relevant fraction of a Medicaid SNAP caseload will
include thousands of recipients at least.163 As for commonality, if class
members’ benefits are delayed, unfairly terminated, or reduced, class counsel
can often tie that injury to a single statutory provision.164 And such a statutory
provision makes it easier for named plaintiffs to show that their situation is not
only typical of the recipients they seek to represent, but also that the
representative parties, being so similarly situated to the unnamed class
members, will fairly and adequately protect the class’s interests.165
A class of public benefits recipients is also in a strong position to request
injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), since it is often seeking to enforce
a federal statutory provision with which the state agency must comply. 166
Driving the federal courts’ fairly rigid approach to enforcing the Food Stamp
Act and the Medicaid Act against state agencies is the fact that these courts
repeatedly insist on absolute, rather than substantial, compliance.167 Given the
161 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342, 367 (2011) (reversing a certification of a
nationwide class of female employees); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336, 352 (2011)
(allowing corporations to insulate themselves from consumer class actions via arbitration clauses).
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
163 See, e.g., Garnett v. Zeilinger, 301 F. Supp. 3d 199, 206 (D.D.C. 2018) (pointing out that “even
taking just the applications processed after the statutory time limit in one quarter of one fiscal year,
[p]laintiffs provide a reason to estimate the proposed class number to be in the hundreds, if not thousands,”
which “presumptively satisfies numerosity”).
164 Id. at 207 (concluding there is commonality because the Food Stamp Act “speaks in terms of
absolute deadlines without any caveats or limitations when it comes to meeting them”).
165 Id. at 210 (determining the plaintiffs met the typicality requirement because they “present a single
legal injury, a single legal theory, and a single means of injury: the District has systemically failed to process
applications or issue recertification notices on time and consequently violated Plaintiffs’ statutory rights
under the SNAP Act”).
166 See id. at 211 (finding that “that injury can be remedied by a single injunction ordering the District
to comply with the statutory timelines”).
167 See, e.g., Withrow v. Concannon, 942 F.2d 1385, 1387–88 (9th Cir. 1991); Haskins v. Stanton,
794 F.2d 1273, 1277 (7th Cir. 1986); Alexander v. Hill, 707 F.2d 780, 784 (4th Cir. 1983) (“The defendants’
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cooperative federalism inherent in both programs, one could imagine that
states would be given some leeway in their administration of welfare programs.
Yet, apart from the notable exception of Armstrong discussed above, federal
courts have insisted on absolute compliance with federal statutes, which
smooths the way for class certification and injunctive relief.
The availability of the class action device in welfare litigation dovetails
with the availability of injunctive relief.168 For instance, a party seeking a
preliminary injunction must show: “(1) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (2)
either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions as
to the merits . . . ; (3) that the balance of hardships tips in their favor regardless
of the likelihood of success; and (4) that an injunction is in the public
interest.”169 As for the second factor, the likelihood of success on the merits
falls back on questions discussed above—whether there is a federal claim and
whether the plaintiffs have made a showing of state noncompliance.170 The
remaining three factors often weigh in favor of the welfare recipients.
In assessing the propriety of a preliminary injunction, federal courts have
repeatedly concluded that the harm stemming from improper denial or
termination of welfare benefits is quintessentially irreparable.171 As a result, the
first factor is met for any case that pleads the loss of welfare benefits.172 Courts
have rejected welfare administrators’ claims that the harm is not irreparable

objection to the 100% applicability of the relief ordered, based on a claim that it is too Draconian, need not
long detain us . . . . The law itself compels 100% compliance.”); Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d
181, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 262 (2d Cir. 2003).
For litigation around the timely processing of SNAP, see Briggs v. Bremby, No. 3:12-cv-324 (VLB),
2012 WL 6026167, at *17–18 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 792 F.3d 239, 240 (2d Cir. 2015); Robidoux
v. Kitchel, 876 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. Vt. 1995); Robertson v. Jackson, 766 F. Supp. 470, 475–76 (E.D. Va.
1991), aff’d, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1992).
168 See Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943–44 (2018) (per curiam).
169 See Brooks v. Roberts, 251 F. Supp. 3d 401, 422 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Gen. Mills, Inc. v.
Chobani, LLC, 158 F. Supp. 3d 106, 114 (N.D.N.Y. 2016)) (applying this test to a class action brought by
all ABAWD SNAP recipients in New York).
170 See David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 797–98 (2016) (arguing
that class certification often becomes a preview of the merits of the case and the requested remedy).
171 Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“To indigent persons, the loss of even a
portion of subsistence benefits constitutes irreparable injury.”); Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251, 264
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (reasoning that a “loss of even a small portion of welfare benefits can constitute irreparable
injury”). But see Brooks, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 433 (concluding irreparable harm factor weighs against SNAP
recipient class because for “the alleged harm flowing from the lack of due process and statutory protections,
any harm to recipients whose benefits are discontinued based on being a non-compliant ABAWD is cut by
the fact that they can immediately reestablish eligibility by reapplying for benefits and complying with work
rules”).
172 Where some courts hesitate to grant preliminary injunctions in welfare cases is when the plaintiffs
cannot show that their benefits have, in fact, been terminated or that an adverse decision is imminent. Id. at
432.
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because the administrator will compensate the plaintiffs with restored benefits,
including benefits dating back to the erroneous agency action, should the
plaintiffs prevail.173 Furthermore, due to the grave risk of harm to welfare
recipients of lost benefits—the concept of “brutal need” from Goldberg v.
Kelly—the balance of hardships and the public interest often weigh in the
welfare recipient’s favor.174
3. Financing Welfare Litigation
This is not to say that welfare applicants and recipients seeking relief in
federal court do not encounter skepticism or even hostility from the bench. No
doubt many Americans, judges included, share beliefs and biases that
recipients are scroungers.175 Furthermore, regardless of what they think about
welfare, federal judges are often reluctant to wade into the morass of any
government bureaucracy. But the cases discussed above suggest that arguably
the greatest impediments to litigation on behalf of welfare applicants and
recipients are not driven by a lack of doctrine. Instead, the real threat is a lack
of funding. When the Supreme Court heard the canonical cases of King v.
Smith, Shapiro v. Thompson, Goldberg v. Kelly, and Dandridge v. Williams,
the federal government had just begun to fund legal services for poor
Americans. Although that funding increased significantly for a time, over the
last fifty years the federal government has made deep cuts to that funding and
attached a variety of strings to whatever funding was left.176 Since 1974, legal
173

See supra note 167.
See, e.g., Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming a district court judge’s
conclusion that “the hardship to plaintiffs and their class . . . outweigh[ed] the administrative inconvenience
and cost”); Willis v. Lascaris, 499 F. Supp. 749, 759 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Even a slight change in food stamp
allotments effects a public assistance household’s ability to procure the necessities of life.” (citing Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970))); Hudson v. Bowling, 752 S.E.2d 313, 322–23 (W. Va. 2013) (concluding
notices from state SNAP agency did not comport with constitutional due process); Baker v. Alaska Dep’t of
Health & Soc. Servs., 191 P.3d 1005, 1009–10 (Alaska 2008) (reading Goldberg to mean that Medicaid
recipients “should be afforded a degree of protection from agency error and arbitrariness in the
administration of those benefits” and concluding notices from state agency did not meet the constitutional
standard of procedural due process); Hardges v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 442 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989) (same, but with regards to SNAP); see also Blum v. Caldwell, 446 U.S. 1311, 1314 (1980) (Marshall,
J., in chambers) (order denying stay of mandate to continue to provide Medicaid) (reasoning that “the very
survival of these individuals and those class members . . . is threatened by a denial of medical assistance
benefits”).
175 David Lauter, How Do Americans View Poverty? Many Blue-Collar Whites, Key to Trump, Criticize
Poor People as Lazy and Content to Stay on Welfare, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/
projects/la-na-pol-poverty-poll/ [https://perma.cc/LCU8-KFGM] (describing a public opinion survey).
176 See Andrew Hammond, Poverty Lawyering in the States, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET:
FEDERALISM AND POVERTY, supra note 96, at 215, 222–23; Catherine Albiston, Su Li & Laura Beth Nielson,
Public Interest Law Organizations and the Two-Tier System of Access to Justice in the United States,
42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 990, 1017 (2017) (concluding that “political attacks and legislative constraints
have limited the scope of [these legal organizations’] activities, and developed a striking, empirically
174
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aid organizations funded by the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC) have
not been able to engage in political activities, including voter registration and
labor-organizing activities, or litigate in various areas of public concern,
including abortion and the desegregation of schools.177 Congress cut legal aid
funding in 1982 and 1996 and imposed further restrictions.178 Since 1996, LSCfunded attorneys have been barred from bringing class actions, representing
prisoners, and representing noncitizens (with a couple limited exceptions).179
They cannot lobby in Congress or in state legislatures.180 These restrictions
have fractured the public interest bar that represents welfare recipients.181 With
fewer lawyers to represent Americans who have claims against welfare
bureaucrats, it is not surprising that many legal aid attorneys have spurned
federal funding. And regardless of LSC restrictions, all legal aid lawyers focus
on the regulations and guidance coming out of the relevant federal and state
agencies. Due to the fact that states have some flexibility under SNAP and
Medicaid to extend certification periods and add additional services, legal aid
lawyers have ample opportunities to push for expanding and streamlining both
programs in ways that are consistent with federal law, but often have to do so
with limited and restricted funding.182
documented divide between local and regional organizations that provide direct services and national
organizations that seek law reform”); David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive
Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 224 (2003) (arguing that Legal Services Corporation
restrictions were designed to remove any form of advocacy for “entire subgroups” of low-income people);
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: HOW CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY
HALF A LAWYER 9–13 (2000) (discussing the prohibition on Legal Services Corporation-funded lawyers
from filing class actions).
177 Hammond, supra note 176, at 222.
178 Id.
179 See Luban, supra 176, at 221; Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance to Immigrants in the
United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619, 652–55 (2011) (providing a comprehensive overview of the
restrictions on representing noncitizens).
180 45 C.F.R. § 1612.1 (1998); see also LSC Restrictions and Other Funding Sources, LEGAL SERVS.
CORP., https://lsc.gov/lsc-restrictions-and-funding-sources [https://perma.cc/5AKQ-PC35].
181 See Hammond, supra note 176, at 222; see also Sameer M. Ashar, Deep Critique and Democratic
Lawyering in Clinical Practice, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 201, 228 (2016) (explaining how many clinics focus on
direct, and often limited, representation over other types of lawyering); ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO
BONO & PUB. SERV. & THE CTR. FOR PRO BONO, SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK
OF
AMERICA’S
LAWYERS
3,
6,
45
(2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/probono_public_service/ls_pb_supporting_j
ustice_iv_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX6H-NX8S] (surveying 47,242 attorneys in twenty-four states and
estimating that in 2016, American attorneys provided an average of 36.9 hours of pro bono); Rebecca L.
Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil Legal Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
79, 97 (2007) (estimating that it would take fifty-nine pro bono attorneys to make up for a single, year-round
legal aid attorney).
182 For instance, the Food and Nutrition Service publishes an annual report detailing how states use this
flexibility. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., STATE OPTIONS REPORT: SUPPLEMENTAL
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The combination of a lack of substantive constitutional rights to
assistance and the prodigious growth of Medicaid and SNAP made these
programs tempting targets for retrenchment once the Republican Party
regained control of the presidency and both houses of Congress in 2017. The
next Part explains how these retrenchment efforts have fared.
II. THE NEW PROPERTY UNDER ATTACK: SNAP AND MEDICAID IN THE
TRUMP ERA
The surprising strength of Medicaid and SNAP is explained, in part, by
how the courts and public interest lawyers make it difficult for legislators and
agencies to cut existing benefits. Yet, this account of poverty law’s durability
runs counter to the current political climate, in which detractors of both
programs control much of federal and state lawmaking. 183 This stress test for
SNAP and Medicaid is what makes this analysis so timely. From 2017 to 2019,
committed welfare retrenchers—those dedicated to reducing spending on
SNAP and Medicaid—controlled much of national and state government,
precisely at a time when spending on means-tested programs has continued to
increase over the last half century. The 115th Congress teemed with legislators
interested in reducing the size of welfare expenditures. The most prominent
was then-Speaker of the House Paul Ryan who, as a former chair of both the
Ways and Means Committee and the Budget Committee, repeatedly advocated
for transformative proposals to Medicaid and SNAP.184 Similarly, in the Trump
Administration, there are also many officials with experience and interest in
dismantling the welfare state.185
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1 (14th ed. 2018) [hereinafter STATE OPTIONS REPORT], https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/14-State-Options.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY9M-UFXA].
183 See Video: National Review Institute Ideas Summit, Speaker Paul Ryan (C-SPAN 2017),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?425555-6/national-review-institute-ideas-summit-speaker-paul-ryan (last
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“Medicaid—sending it back to the states, capping its growth rates. We have been
dreaming of this since I’ve been around, since you and I were drinking at a keg.”).
184 See TASK FORCE ON POVERTY, OPPORTUNITY, & UPWARD MOBILITY, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION
FOR
A
CONFIDENT
AMERICA
11–12
(2016),
https://www.heartland.org/_templateassets/documents/publications/abetterway-poverty-policypaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8JP-4S6F]. ThenSpeaker Paul Ryan created the task force in 2016. John Bresnahan & David Rogers, New House Republican
‘Anti-Poverty Plan’ Repackages GOP Proposals, POLITICO (June 7, 2017, 12:03 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/house-gop-poverty-223969
[https://perma.cc/3BHR-UAJ7];
HOUSE BUDGET COMM., 114TH CONG., FY2016 BUDGET RESOLUTION: A BALANCED BUDGET FOR A
STRONGER AMERICA 20, 29 (2015) (proposing to repeal Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion to allow states
to manage their Medicaid programs and to convert SNAP to a “State Flexibility Fund”).
185 For example, Vice President Mike Pence’s former State Medicaid Director Seema Verma now runs
the federal Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services. See Rachana Pradhan & Alice Miranda Ollstein,
How Mike Pence’s ‘Indiana Mafia’ Took Over Health Care Policy, POLITICO (May 20, 2019, 5:04 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/20/mike-pence-health-care-1331705
[https://perma.cc/C8G7-
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Importantly, this unified government in Washington mirrored the GOP’s
near-total control of state government. Starting in the 2010 midterm election,
the Republican Party made consistent, nationwide gains in state elections.186
Following the 2016 election, Republicans controlled both chambers of the state
legislature in thirty-two states.187 In contrast to the federal government, which
has been synonymous with divided government since 1981,188 state
governments exhibit increasingly unified, partisan control.189 The ubiquity of
unified state government streamlined policy change in several areas, including
welfare. While Congress sets parameters for funding and eligibility of
Medicaid and SNAP, states make important decisions about how those benefits
are administered, such as whether to cover optional populations and whether
to provide optional services. Furthermore, states can request waivers from the
federal government to further change how their agencies run welfare programs.
This Part analyzes how the Trump Administration, the 115th Congress,
and their political allies in state government have tried to dismantle SNAP and
Medicaid. It describes how opponents of safety net programs failed to enact

NCMQ] (discussing Verma’s record in Indiana and HHS Secretary Azar’s previous work for Indiana-based
drug company Eli Lilly); see also Jake Harper, Trump Picks Seema Verma to Run Medicare and Medicaid,
NPR (Nov. 29, 2016, 5:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/11/29/503762324/trumppicks-seema-verma-to-run-medicare-and-medicaid [https://perma.cc/P4NE-C4CU] (describing Verma’s
involvement in Indiana’s Medicaid expansion and the expansion’s intent “to appeal to conservatives”).
186 During President Obama’s two terms, Democrats lost—on net—816 seats, the largest of a two-term
presidency since Dwight D. Eisenhower. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ANALYSIS ON THE
ELECTION
FROM
THE
STATE
PERSPECTIVE
(2016),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Statevote/StateVote_Combined%20Presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBP
9-WUYW].
187 Id.
188 Since 1981, there were only three periods where either party has controlled both houses of Congress
and the presidency: 2003 to 2007 for the Republicans and 2009 to 2011 for the Democrats. The election of
President Trump and the GOP-controlled 115th Congress, the period that is the focus of this Article, is the
third. See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/
[https://perma.cc/M75A-5LGB]; Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/
partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/PSF6-4YZ5]. For discussions of how divided government in Washington
functions differently from unified government or not, compare DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN:
PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–2002, at 2–4 (2d ed. 2005), suggesting
Congress is productive even when different parties control each chamber or the presidency, with MORRIS
FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 110 (Sean Wakely & Stephen Hull eds., 2d ed. 1996), documenting how
divided government can frustrate national lawmaking.
189 Following the 2018 midterm elections, many journalists and political analysts pointed out that not
since 1914 has only one state had a divided legislature. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney & Sydney Ember,
Election Consolidates One-Party Control over State Legislatures, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/state-house-elections.html
[https://perma.cc/EUR6-JR7M]
(noting that, following the 2018 midterms, one party controls both chambers in every state legislature except
Minnesota’s).
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Medicaid and SNAP cuts, despite their control of both the Executive and
Legislative Branches of the federal government.190 By adopting the
categorization of previous scholarship on welfare state retrenchment, this Part
suggests that direct, traditional attacks on both programs, so-called
“programmatic retrenchment,” failed spectacularly. Despite unified
government, President Trump and congressional leaders were unable to repeal
the Affordable Care Act, defund Medicaid or SNAP through block grants, or
achieve structural cuts and increased conditionality to SNAP in the Farm Bill.
The White House and their congressional allies were more successful in their
efforts at “systemic retrenchment,” which consists of depriving state and
federal government of resources and revenue in order to undermine past
expansions. To that end, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and less visible
budgetary maneuvers put discretionary spending on a collision course with
historically low tax rates—a wreck that will be foisted on future lawmakers.191
The government shutdown in 2019 may also be best understood as an example
of systemic retrenchment, as the federal government’s closure jeopardized
SNAP benefits.192 That said, the heart of this Part posits that the lawmaking
worth tracing is no longer in Congress, but in federal and state agencies. The
Trump Administration and certain states are pursuing an interconnected
strategy to cut SNAP and Medicaid not through legislation, but through
regulation and devolution—a kind of lawmaking in the shadow of Congress.
Therefore, tracking these state-focused efforts better explains the real threat
facing anti-poverty programs today and the lasting influence of the New
Property’s procedural protections.

190 See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted). The Senate
companion bill was S. 3042, but it did not pass the Senate. S. 3042, 115th Cong. (2018); see also American
Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017). The Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017 was
a Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1628. Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017,
Amendment H.R. 1628, LYN17343, 115th Cong. (June 26, 2017) (amendment in the nature of a substitute).
191 The tax cuts represent arguably the best example of systemic retrenchment by the Trump
Administration. See, e.g., Erica Werner, White House Budget Director Effectively Admits Tax Bill Doesn’t
Pay for Itself, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2018, 5:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/
2018/02/14/white-house-budget-director-effectively-admits-tax-bill-doesnt-pay-for-itself/
[https://
perma.cc/892N-4KCU]; Sam Fleming, US Budget Deficit Hits $779bn in Trump’s First Full Fiscal Year,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://ft.com/content/c8a990d8-d0a5-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5
[https://perma.cc/M6H2-VY75]. Indeed, this effort by President Trump parallels Presidents Ronald Reagan
and George W. Bush’s earlier systemic retrenchment in reducing tax revenues. PIERSON, supra note 11, at
149–55 (discussing Reagan’s “impairment of the federal government’s ability to generate tax revenues”);
Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, 3 PERSPS. ON
POL. 15, 23 (2005) (casting Bush tax cuts in a similar light).
192 See, e.g., Helena Bottemiller Evich, Food Stamps for Millions of Americans Become Pawn in
Shutdown Fight, POLITICO (Jan. 7, 2019, 10:25 AM), http://politico.com/story/2019/01/07/food-stampsgovernment-shutdown-1062090 [https://perma.cc/JJM2-F5BA].
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A. Legislative Action
With control of both houses of Congress and the White House for the first
time in over a decade, the Republican Party appeared poised in 2017 to make
significant cuts to Medicaid and SNAP. The Republican Party’s stated
priorities were to repeal the Affordable Care Act, cut taxes, and shrink the
federal government’s size, and the GOP insisted that those goals were served
by paring back both growing assistance programs.193 These kinds of legislative
actions that are designed to reduce benefit levels and decrease the number of
benefit recipients are typically considered examples of programmatic
retrenchment. However, as seen in the failed efforts to roll back Medicaid and
slash SNAP, all of these efforts in Congress proved futile.
1. The Failed Efforts to Roll Back Medicaid
The Trump Administration’s legislative efforts to cut Medicaid are bound
up with its broader policy of undoing the Affordable Care Act. Just as President
Obama’s first session of Congress was consumed by trying to enact the
Affordable Care Act, President Trump’s was dominated by attempts to repeal
it. However, despite significant coordination between the Trump
Administration and Republican congressional leadership, the repeal of the
ACA failed repeatedly.194 For the purposes of this Article, there is neither room
nor reason to recount the play-by-play of Congress’s unsuccessful efforts to
repeal the ACA beyond a single footnote.195 Suffice it to say, had the Trump
193 PLATFORM COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 1–2 (2016), https://prod-cdnstatic.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YLM2-UEGU] (promising to cut taxes); id. at 23 (promising to shrink the size of the
federal government); id. at 36 (promising to repeal the Affordable Care Act).
194 See Tessa Berenson, Reminder: The House Voted to Repeal Obamacare More Than 50 Times, TIME
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://time.com/4712725/ahca-house-repeal-votes-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/8VEEP6DW].
195 American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., The American Health Care Act Is Critical First Step Toward Protecting Patients (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/03/07/american-health-care-act-critical-first-step-towardprotecting-patients.html [https://perma.cc/D2FT-CUDR] (supporting first repeal-and-replace bill, entitled
the American Health Care Act, upon its introduction in the House); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 256,
OFF.
OF
THE
CLERK:
U.S.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
(May
4,
2017),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll256.xml [https://perma.cc/96U8-3MUN] (passing the American Health
Care Act). The Senate then released the Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA), which would have capped
Medicaid spending, repealed tax provisions paying for ACA benefits, and allowed states to waive consumer
protections in health law. See Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, Senate Health Care Bill Includes Deep Cuts
to Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2tSE2IN [https://perma.cc/64NC-ZQNZ]. Senate
sponsors then released a revised version of the BCRA. See Better Care Reconciliation Act, H.R. 1628,
ERN17490, 115th Cong. (July 13, 2017) (amendment in the nature of a substitute). While the Senate initially
voted to begin debate on a revised BCRA, the Senate then rejected the legislation. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan
& Robert Pear, Senate Votes Down Broad Obamacare Repeal, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017),
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Administration and the Republican Congress repealed the Affordable Care
Act, millions of Medicaid recipients would have lost their health insurance,196
and Medicaid’s trajectory would have changed dramatically.197 Important for
our purposes, although not all ACA-repeal efforts included a Medicaid block
grant, all versions eliminated the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and reduced
Medicaid spending further.198 The fact that the 115th Congress only considered
ACA-repeal legislation that would have cut Medicaid betrays the role
Medicaid now plays in our public health insurance system.199 Once the
Democrats took control of the House in January 2019, the Trump
Administration indicated their intention to bypass Congress and block grant
Medicaid using regulations and waivers.200
2. The Failed Efforts to Slash SNAP
Despite consistent promises and proposals by the Trump Administration
and Republicans in Congress to achieve structural cuts to SNAP by turning it
into a block grant to states, those efforts, like the efforts to cut Medicaid, have
foundered. Following President Trump’s inauguration, Republicans in the
House proposed $150 billion in cuts to SNAP.201 Those proposals came to
https://nyti.ms/2tWG2cz [https://perma.cc/2QYW-6EW8] (analyzing first failed floor vote); Sean Sullivan,
Juliet Eilperin & Kelsey Snell, Senate GOP Effort to Unwind the ACA Collapses Monday, WASH. POST
(Sept. 25, 2017, 8:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/new-version-of-health-care-billwill-help-alaska-and-maine--home-of-two-holdout-senators/2017/09/25/24697f62-a188-11e7-b14ff41773cd5a14_story.html [https://perma.cc/K2D4-9RKB] (detailing recognition among Senate leaders that
there were not enough votes to repeal and replace the ACA).
196
See CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 1628, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ACT OF 2017 tbl.4
(2017); Letter from Keith Hall, Dir., Cong. Budget Off., to Hon. Mike Enzi, Chairman, Comm. on the
Budget (July 20, 2017) (regarding H.R. 1628, the Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017: An Amendment
in the Nature of a Substitute) (on file with journal).
197 See Letter from Keith Hall, supra note 196 (estimating that in the BCRA “[t]he largest savings would
come from a reduction in total federal spending for Medicaid resulting both from provisions affecting health
insurance coverage and from other provisions,” and that “[b]y 2026, spending for that program would be
reduced by 26 percent”).
198 See Aaron E. Carroll, How Would Republican Plans for Medicaid Block Grants Actually Work?,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2kEw1Qu [https://perma.cc/Z3WE-4DKA].
199 See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET:
FEDERALISM AND POVERTY, supra note 96, at 197, 211 (“Despite targeting only the deserving poor for its
first five decades, Medicaid covers half of all births, more than a third of all children, and is the primary
payor for long-term care—anyone who lives long enough is highly likely to become a Medicaid
Beneficiary.”).
200 Rachana Pradhan & Dan Diamond, Trump Wants to Bypass Congress on Medicaid Plan, POLITICO
(Jan. 11, 2019, 5:14 PM), https://politico.com/story/2019/01/11/trump-bypass-congress-medicaid-plan1078885 [https://perma.cc/9RAL-LAE7].
201 Greg Trotter, Food Stamp Program Faces Uncertain Future as Power Shifts in Washington, CHI.
TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://chicagotribune.com/business/ct-food-stamps-block-grants-0108-biz-20170105story.html [https://perma.cc/3DLZ-H6E2]. Although the 2018 budget proposal did not mention the phrase,
most think tanks and analysts interpreted the House budget proposal to mean something akin to block grants.
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naught. Despite being unable to make deep cuts to SNAP through the budget
process, the 115th Congress and the Trump Administration had another
significant opportunity to codify SNAP cuts: namely, the Farm Bill. The Farm
Bill is the omnibus legislation that reauthorizes federal agriculture and
nutrition spending for a five-year period.202 The Nutrition Title, which
authorizes SNAP funding, has become the largest expenditure in that
legislation—and increasingly so over the last twenty years.203 Since 2014, the
Republican House leadership made it clear that they saw the Farm Bill as a
vehicle for their vision of welfare reform.204 In the House version of the 2018
Farm Bill (an $860 billion legislation that passed by only two votes), the House
made changes to the SNAP program that would have cut SNAP benefits for
millions of Americans.205 The House bill sought to reduce SNAP benefits in
three ways, one of which is worth detailing because it has since resurfaced in
regulatory efforts.206 The House version tightened the time limit for ablebodied adults without dependents who did not meet a work requirement, which
would have ultimately removed 1.2 million recipients from the program.
Analysts connected the work requirements proposal in the House bill as part
of a coordinated campaign by the Trump Administration and the GOP-led
Congress to make similar changes to Medicaid.207
ISAAC SHAPIRO, RICHARD KOGAN & CHLOE CHO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, HOUSE GOP
BUDGET CUTS PROGRAMS AIDING LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME PEOPLE BY $2.9 TRILLION OVER DECADE
4 (2017).
202 RENÉE JOHNSON & JIM MONKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22131, WHAT IS THE FARM BILL? 1 & n.1
(2018) (identifying the “17 farm bills since the 1930s” and concluding that “[f]arm bills have become
increasingly omnibus in nature since 1973, when the nutrition title was included”).
203 Id. at 7 (“[W]hen the 2008 farm bill was enacted, the nutrition title was 67% of the five-year total.
When the 2014 farm bill was enacted, the nutrition share had risen to 80%.”). Lawmakers have tried
repeatedly to separate the Nutrition Title from the rest of the Farm Bill, most recently in 2013. Jonathan
Weisman & Ron Nixon, House Republicans Push Through Farm Bill, Without Food Stamps, N.Y. TIMES
(July 11, 2013), https://nyti.ms/14L66pW [https://perma.cc/6KCK-Q838].
204 See STAFF OF HOUSE BUDGET COMM., 113TH CONG., THE WAR ON POVERTY: 50 YEARS LATER 81,
92, 96 (2014).
205 Jeff Stein, Congress Just Passed an $867 Billion Farm Bill. Here’s What’s in It, WASH. POST (Dec.
12, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/12/11/congresss-billion-farm-bill-isout-heres-whats-it/ [https://perma.cc/4P8W-US77].
206 The 2018 Farm Bill was officially entitled the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 and enacted as
Public Law 115-334. See H.R. 2, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted).
207 Diana R.H. Winters, Everything You Need to Know About the Upcoming Farm Bill Debate, HEALTH
AFFS. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2018), https://healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180215.383921/full/
[https://perma.cc/V5DU-S8GA] (describing the Department of Agriculture’s position as “consistent with
the administration’s broader efforts to connect public benefits to work requirements, as in the Medicaid
program”). Under the House version, states could have continued to exempt a portion of the caseload and
request geographic waivers based on labor-market measures, but with some amendments. The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the House-passed work-related changes would reduce spending on
SNAP benefits by approximately $14.1 billion over ten years and would have increased spending on program
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However, when the Senate passed its version of the Farm Bill only a week
later, the legislation contained none of these proposed cuts to SNAP. By a vote
of 86–11, the Senate passed its version of the Farm Bill, which essentially
maintained the status quo for SNAP.208 Both the Chairman and the Ranking
Member of the Senate Agriculture Committee stated that the House cuts to
SNAP and the work requirements could not pass the sixty-vote threshold for
legislation in the Senate, and the Senate voted down an amendment to the bill
that would have added work requirements.209 Thus, despite having both House
and Senate versions of the Farm Bill by the end of June 2018, Congress failed
to pass the Farm Bill before authorization expired at the end of September
2018.210 The failure to pass the Farm Bill before the expiration date became a
key issue in many congressional races during the 2018 cycle.211 After the 2018
midterm election confirmed that the Democrats would control the House in the
next Congress, the House and Senate agreed, during the lame-duck session of
the 115th Congress, to a Farm Bill that left out all three of these cuts to SNAP
benefits.
Yet, there was one feature of the final bill that aligned with the Trump
Administration and Republican Congress’s goal of defunding SNAP.
Although the Senate included a provision blocking the Trump Administration
from cracking down on state ABAWD waivers, that provision was dropped in
the final version of the Farm Bill, which the President signed.212 The same day
President Trump signed the 2018 Farm Bill, the President’s Secretary of
Agriculture, Sonny Perdue, announced a proposed rule that would tighten work
requirements for ABAWDs, characterizing the requirements as “commonadministration by approximately $7.3 billion—a net reduction of $6.8 billion. Letter from Keith Hall, Dir.,
Cong. Budget Off., to Hon. Michael Conaway, Chairman, Comm. on Agric. (Apr. 13, 2018) (on file with
journal).
208 Catherine Boudreau & Liz Crampton, Senate Passes Farm Bill, Setting Up Food Stamp Battle with
the House, POLITICO (June 28, 2019, 8:09 PM), https://politico.com/story/2018/06/28/senate-passes-farmbill-683232 [https://perma.cc/X4ZP-B3VM].
209 Id.
210 See Humeyra Pamuk, U.S. Lawmakers, at Impasse on New Farm Bill, Mull Extension of Old One,
REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2018, 1:34 PM), https://reuters.com/article/us-usa-farmbill/u-s-lawmakers-at-impasse-onnew-farm-bill-mull-extension-of-old-one-idUSKCN1MC2EU [https://perma.cc/A93L-MYZ6].
211 See Jeff Daniels, Stalled Farm Bill Grabs Attention During Midterms, Expected on Front Burner
When Congress Returns, CNBC (Nov. 1, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://cnbc.com/2018/10/31/stalled-farm-billexpected-on-front-burner-when-congress-returns-.html [https://perma.cc/RAF6-B8JX].
212 See Helena Bottemiller Evich & Catherine Boudreau, Farm Bill Headed to Trump After Landslide
House Approval, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://politico.com/story/2018/12/12/house-passesfarm-bill-1060916 [https://perma.cc/AE5N-P3SL] (“Well, we lost the House of Representatives in
November . . . That was the final nail on the coffin in terms of leverage that I got.” (quoting House
Agriculture Chairman Mike Conaway)). Conservatives proclaimed the ABAWD omission “a win because
it allows USDA to tighten the process without congressional approval.” Id.
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sense policy, particularly at a time when the unemployment rate is at a
generational low.”213 As the next Section explores, the Department of
Agriculture’s proposed work requirement regulation was the first of several
efforts to cut SNAP through agency action—many of which run parallel to
similar efforts by the Trump Administration to undo Medicaid.
B. Administrative Action
Both during and after these efforts in Congress, the Trump Administration
pursued agency actions that sought to achieve the same policy they had
attempted via legislation, namely, reducing access to and generosity of SNAP
and Medicaid benefits. To do so, the Trump Administration combined three
major strategies: devolution to states, disaggregation of the recipient
population, and increased conditionality of benefit receipt.214 This framework
for administrative action suggests an understanding among opponents of these
programs on how to undo the protections envisioned by the New Property.
However, the federal courts’ rulings on work requirements in Medicaid,
SNAP, and public charge litigation demonstrate that there are potent checks on
the Trump Administration’s efforts to achieve through regulation what it has
failed to enact through legislation.
1. The Trump Administration’s Strategy
Following the successive defeats in Congress to legislate cuts in food and
medical assistance, the Trump Administration looked to achieve similar ends
through an interlocking strategy, what I call “devolved, disaggregated
conditionality,” for both the SNAP and Medicaid programs. 215 By and large,
the Trump Administration has sought to reduce food and medical assistance
213 Press Release, USDA, USDA to Restore Original Intent of SNAP: A Second Chance, Not a Way of
Life (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/news-item/usda-restore-original-intent-snap-secondchance-not-way-life [https://perma.cc/NGA9-6MXR] (quoting Department of Agriculture Secretary Sonny
Perdue); see also Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 22 (Feb. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R pt. 273).
214 See Reducing Poverty in America by Promoting Opportunity and Economic Mobility, Exec. Order
No. 13,828, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,941, 15,943 (Apr. 10, 2018) (requiring eight Cabinet-level secretaries to each
submit a report to the President with “a list of recommended regulatory and policy changes and other actions
to accomplish the principles outlined in this order,” and within 90 days of submitting those reports, to “take
steps to implement the recommended administrative actions”); see also Ezra Rosser, Pulling from a Dated
Playbook: President Trump’s Executive Order on Poverty, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.blog.harvardlawreview.org/pulling-from-a-dated-playbook-president-trumps-executive-orderon-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/2846-RXYQ] (analyzing and criticizing the order).
215 This account cuts against those proposed by some who have found that the Trump Administration’s
efforts in this area are fundamentally incoherent or held together only by animus. See, e.g., David A. Super,
Opinion, The Cruelty of Trump’s Poverty Policy, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2y6tUtZ
[https://perma.cc/MDE3-37W5].
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not by regulating both programs nationwide, but by directing federal agencies
to cut SNAP and Medicaid through partnerships with like-minded elected
officials and bureaucrats in state government.216 Using the discourse of
federalism, the Trump Administration has characterized many of these
proposals as optional for the states. Yet, none of the devolutionary proposals
permit states to expand either program. The only choice states have under these
policies is to reduce benefits and services. This “insincere devolution” is
similar to earlier cooperative-federalism efforts in Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), the cash assistance program, in the wake of welfare
reform.217
Not only has the Trump Administration pursued a state-specific strategy;
it is group-specific within any particular state. The Administration has not
attempted any changes to the entire SNAP or Medicaid caseload in a given
state. Instead, federal agencies have exploited fractured definitions of
American citizenship. Long before President Trump took office, American
public law constructed tiers of social citizenship.218 And for the last fifty years,
there have always been restrictions on which needy Americans could access
SNAP and Medicaid. For instance, Americans who reside on tribal lands, in
overseas territories, or who live in mixed-status families experience a distinct,
often deteriorating safety net.219 Similarly, Americans who do not have
children, or at least are not raising children in the home, also cannot equally
access SNAP and Medicaid. Notably, the Affordable Care Act eliminated most
of these distinctions across citizenship with its Medicaid expansion, but the
Supreme Court deemed that expansion unconstitutionally coercive for states.220
It is no accident that these groups are considered to be less politically powerful.
216 Somewhat surprisingly, the Trump Administration has not made similar efforts to devolve control
of SNAP and Medicaid to private actors. See generally JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP:
PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 119–42 (2017) (characterizing privatization efforts
over the last forty years as an existential threat to the American public law system).
217 See Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1741–44 (2017)
(describing how TANF devolution is, in effect, “statutized deterioration”). For a discussion of how the
implementation of devolved standards of the TANF program and PRWORA did not live up to the policy
promises from Washington, respectively, see Zatz, supra note 84, at 1134, 1155, and Jon Michaels,
Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal
Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 604–06 (2004).
218 See generally FOX, supra note 39, at 291–94 (discussing the exclusion of Blacks and Mexicans from
New Deal programs and its implication today).
219 See Andrew Hammond, The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era?, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 501, 505–17 (2018) (detailing the doctrinal, statutory, and regulatory framework for immigrant
families applying for Medicaid, SNAP, SSI, and TANF); The Study of the Food Distribution Program on
Indian Reservations, NORC AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., https://www.norc.org/Research/Projects/Pages/thestudy-of-the-food-distribution-program-on-indian-reservations.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z24H-2J2C].
220 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).
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Even going after the least politically popular or sympathetic populations,
the Trump Administration could not simply cut Medicaid or SNAP benefits for
those groups. While the Supreme Court in Dandridge rejected a constitutional
challenge that would have increased the substantive benefits,221 federal law still
prevents agencies from singling out certain populations for direct cuts. Federal
law requires that states cover certain mandatory populations in both programs.
For Medicaid, federal law also requires that states provide certain services to
every Medicaid recipient.222 A state cannot decline to insure a mandatory
population nor can a state choose to cover a certain population, but deny them
certain mandatory services.223 Similarly, SNAP requires that benefit levels are
uniform across the continental United States.224 Of course, as a near-cash
benefit, SNAP’s generosity rises and falls with a household’s net income, and
administrators can sanction recipients individually.225 But a state cannot create,
via statute or regulation, a new category of recipients that receive reduced
SNAP benefits.226
As a result, benefit levels of Medicaid and SNAP are not immediately
susceptible to regulatory change. Absent amending the federal statute, states
have to come up with some other way to cut both programs, either by
preventing people from signing up or by kicking off current recipients. One of
the challenges with creating these additional conditions is that they impose
costs on the recipient and the administrator. And because both programs
operate under a cooperative-federalism scheme, state administrators could face
a federal lawsuit relying on precedent that has grown up around welfare
programs since Professor Reich penned The New Property in 1964.
2. Work Requirements
The most prominent illustration of the Trump Administration’s
administrative strategy—a mix of devolution, disaggregation, and
conditionality—is the work requirement. Welfare programs have always been
bound up in the myths and realities of low-wage work.227 Work requirements

221

See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)–(m).
223 KLEES ET AL., supra note 108, at 28.
224 See Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Agric. to All Reg’l Dirs., SNAP—Fiscal Year 2019 Cost-ofLiving
Adjustments
(July
27,
2018),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
COLAMemoFY19.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM4R-87RE].
225
See A Quick Guide to SNAP Eligibility and Benefits, supra note 117, at 1–4; see also, e.g., OHIO
ADMIN. CODE 5101:4-3-11.2 (2020).
226 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 540 (1973).
227 Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Yeutter, 947 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that USDA could
sanction a state for failure to comply with federal plan for mandatory employment and training (E&T)
222
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abound in public benefits programs. The most obvious example is TANF,228
but housing programs also include work requirements.229 Similarly, the Trump
Administration has pursued work requirements in SNAP and Medicaid to
make stealth cuts to both programs.230 Here, the federal government invites
states to opt in to applying an additional condition of receiving a public benefit,
namely, that they have to prove a certain number of hours in formal
employment or sometimes activities that could lead to employment, for a
certain segment of the welfare caseload. By looking at these requirements, we
can see the shape of welfare litigation today: namely, the federal government
must rely on state actors, often with varying levels of success.
a. Medicaid work requirements
Since the failure to repeal the Affordable Care Act, the Trump
Administration’s efforts to cut Medicaid have centered on granting waivers to
individual states. Nearly fifty years before the Affordable Care Act, federal law
authorized states to depart from certain requirements of the Social Security Act
to pursue a demonstration project if they received a waiver from the federal
government.231 The Social Security Act empowers the Health and Human
Services (HHS) Secretary to allow states to run an “experimental, pilot, or

program); see also Zatz, supra note 84, at 380–88 (discussing the challenges of defining “work” for the
purposes of a welfare program).
228 See Hammond, supra note 217, at 1722–24; see also Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/familyincome-support/temporary-assistance-for-needy-families [https://perma.cc/PCU4-MKA9].
229 Michele Gilman, The Difference in Being Poor in Red States Versus Blue States, in HOLES IN THE
SAFETY NET, supra note 96, at 68, 70–74 (discussing this feature of welfare governance with respect to work
requirements); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS: APPROVALS OF
MAJOR CHANGES NEED INCREASED TRANSPARENCY (2019) (discussing Medicaid work requirements);
DAVID SUPER, PUBLIC WELFARE LAW 956 (2017) (“Although the Supreme Court in the 1960s and 70s
struck down most states’ attempts to impose behavioral norms on welfare recipients without explicit federal
approval, it ignored these holdings when the norms being imposed related to work.”); Kali Grant, Funke
Aderonmu, Sophie Khan, Kastubh Chahande, Casey Goldvale, Indivar Dutta-Gupta, Aileen Carr & Doug
Steiger, Unworkable & Unwise: Conditioning Access to Programs That Ensure a Basic Foundation for
Families on Work Requirements (Geo. Ctr. on Poverty & Inequality, Working Paper, 2019).
230 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXPANDING WORK REQUIREMENTS IN NON-CASH WELFARE
PROGRAMS 7 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-WorkRequirements-in-Non-Cash-Welfare-Programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8SP-7QTG] (detailing “the current
state of work requirements in Medicaid, SNAP and housing assistance programs” and noting that they “are
much weaker and less expansive than those in TANF”).
231 Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 87-543, 76 Stat. 172 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315)
(commonly referred to as § 1115 of the Social Security Act); S. REP. No. 87-1589, at 31 (1962); see also
Anthony Albanese, The Past, Present, and Future of Section 1115, 128 YALE L.J.F. 827, 828 (2019)
(detailing HHS’s history as a “lenient gatekeeper” in granting waivers); Jonathan R. Bolton, The Case of the
Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy Critique of the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the
Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 92–94 (2003).

408

115:361 (2020)

Litigating Welfare Rights

demonstration project” in its Medicaid program that would otherwise run afoul
of federal requirements if the Secretary determines that that project “is likely
to assist in promoting the objectives” of the Act.232 To apply for the waiver, the
state must follow some basic procedures,233 as must the Secretary in
considering the waiver.234
To date, twenty states have submitted waivers that, if implemented, would
allow them to impose work requirements on Medicaid recipients.235 The
question of whether these waivers violate federal law is best understood
through the litigation involving Kentucky—the first state to receive such a
waiver—and Arkansas. On January 1, 2014, Kentucky opted into the
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion. As a result, more than 400,000
Kentuckians received medical assistance through the Medicaid expansion.236
However, in December 2015, Matt Bevin, who had campaigned against the
Medicaid expansion, began his first term as Kentucky Governor. To honor that
campaign promise, in 2016 Governor Bevin submitted a waiver application to
the Secretary of HHS to “comprehensively transform Medicaid.”237 On July 3,
2017, the Bevin administration submitted a modified waiver.238 Kentucky’s
new Medicaid plan required the expansion-eligible recipients and others to
participate in “community engagement” activities.239 Those activities include
at least eighty hours each month of such activities as a condition of receiving
health coverage. The project also calls for, among other things, increased
premiums and more stringent reporting requirements.240 Kentucky projected
that the state would reduce Medicaid enrollment over a five-year period by
over 95,000 recipients and reduce payments by $2.4 billion.241 However, the
Obama Administration let Kentucky’s application languish.

232

42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). Section 1115 of the Social Security Act requires that the Secretary consider
two criteria before granting the waiver: (1) whether the project is an “experimental, pilot or demonstration
project,” and (2) whether the project is “likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of the Act. Id.
233 See 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a) (2019).
234 Id. § 431.416(b), (e)(1).
235 Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (June 11, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-approved-andpending-section-1115-waivers-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/MXA2-4KQV].
236 Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 2018).
237 Letter from Matthew G. Bevin, Governor of Ky., to Hon. Sylvia Burwell, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs. (Aug. 24, 2016) (discussing HEALTH § 1115 Demonstration) (on file with journal).
238 Letter from Adam Meier, Deputy Chief of Staff, Off. of Governor Matthew G. Bevin, to Brian Neale,
Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs. (July 3, 2017) (discussing Kentucky HEALTH § 1115 Demonstration
Modification Request) (on file with journal).
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
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In contrast, the Trump Administration, before and after its efforts to repeal
the ACA, made concerted efforts to encourage such waiver applications. On
March 14, 2017, HHS Secretary Price and the new Administrator of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Seema Verma published
a letter to all governors encouraging them to apply for Medicaid waivers. The
“Dear Governor” letter singled out the ACA expansion group, describing it as
“a clear departure from the core, historical mission of the program” and
offering to “fast-track” approval of waivers that dealt with this population.242
Despite the promise to fast track, no work requirement waivers were approved
for several months. Presumably, the Trump Administration held off giving
states further guidance because they were after bigger game: the repeal of the
ACA. Once the repeal-and-replace bill was defeated in the Senate, however,
the Administration ramped up its efforts, publicly and privately. In November
2017, Verma declared that the ACA’s decision to “move[] millions of
working-age, non-disabled adults into” Medicaid “does not make sense,” and
announced that CMS would resist that change by approving state waivers that
contain work requirements.243 To that end, on January 11, 2018, CMS
published a letter “announcing a new policy designed to assist states in their
efforts to improve Medicaid enrollee health and well-being through
incentivizing work and community engagement among nonelderly,
nonpregnant adult Medicaid beneficiaries who are eligible for Medicaid on a
basis other than disability.”244 This letter was aimed squarely at people who
242 Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, Health & Hum. Servs. & Seema Verma, Adm’r, CMS, to All
Governors (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sec-price-admin-verma-ltr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CTZ-RXY9]. A few months later, Verma authored an op-ed describing how the United
States had “a rare opportunity, through a combination of congressional and administrative actions, to
fundamentally transform Medicaid.” Seema Verma, Opinion, Lawmakers Have a Rare Chance to Transform
Medicaid.
They
Should
Take
It,
WASH. POST
(June
27,
2017,
4:22
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lawmakers-have-a-rare-chance-to-transform-medicaid-theyshould-take-it/2017/06/27/f8e5408a-5b49-11e7-9b7d-14576dc0f39d_story.html [https://perma.cc/W6ABDNCP].
243 Seema Verma, Adm’r, CMS, Remarks at the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD)
2017 Fall Conference (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/speech-remarksadministrator-seema-verma-national-association-medicaid-directors-namd-2017-fall
[https://perma.cc/NN2A-JCBB]. A few days later, Verma said in an interview that one of the “major,
fundamental flaws in the Affordable Care Act was putting in able-bodied adults” since Medicaid was “not
designed for an able-bodied person.” The Future of: Health Care, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2017, 4:10 PM)
https://www.wsj.com/video/the-future-of-health-care/D5B767E4-B2F2-4394-90BB-37935CCD410C.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020). In the interview, Verma also said that CMS was “trying [to] restructure the
Medicaid program.” Id.
244 Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs. (Jan. 11,
2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AZ2Q-LELM] (regarding “Opportunities to Promote Work and Community Engagement Among Medicaid
Beneficiaries”).
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received Medicaid under the ACA expansion.245 The next day, HHS approved
Kentucky’s Medicaid waiver.246
Shortly after, sixteen named plaintiffs, on behalf of all Kentucky
Medicaid recipients, filed a class action in federal court arguing that HHS’s
approval of the Kentucky waiver violated the Social Security Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).247 In their complaint, the class
representatives pointed out that, by the end of 2014, over 375,000 Kentuckians
had enrolled in Medicaid.248 In addition to detailing the medical services
received by these ACA-expansion Medicaid recipients, the plaintiffs
emphasized the reduction in Kentucky hospitals’ uncompensated care costs
and the 12,000 new jobs attributed to the Medicaid expansion.249 In addition to
requesting certification as a class under Rule 23(b)(2), the plaintiffs requested,
inter alia, that the district court issue a declaratory judgment that Administrator
Verma’s letter to State Medicaid Directors (SMDL) and the decision to
approve Kentucky’s waiver violated federal law as well as preliminarily and
permanently enjoin the SMDL.250
The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, in
part, and vacated the HHS Secretary’s grant of Kentucky’s Medicaid waiver.251
Reviewing the agency record, Judge James E. Boasberg held that the HHS
Secretary “never adequately considered whether Kentucky HEALTH would in
fact help the state furnish medical assistance to its citizens, a central objective
of Medicaid.”252 Judge Boasberg concluded that that “signal omission”
rendered the Secretary’s determination arbitrary and capricious and in
violation of the APA.253 Judge Boasberg noted that while TANF and SNAP
“condition benefits on working, there is no equivalent for the Medicaid
program.”254 Looking at past agency practice, Judge Boasberg pointed out that
“during the 50-plus years of Medicaid, CMS has not previously approved a

245 See David A. Super, A Hiatus in Soft-Power Administrative Law: The Case of Medicaid Eligibility
Waivers, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1590, 1594–95 (2018).
246 Letter from Brian Neale, Deputy Adm’r, Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to Adam Meier, Deputy
Chief of Staff, Off. of Governor Matthew Bevin (Jan. 12, 2018), https://affordablecareactlitigation.files.
wordpress.com/2018/11/5745524-0-18348.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7XW-9VXG].
247 Class Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, Stewart v. Hargan, No. 18-cv-152
(D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2018). Alex Azar later replaced Acting HHS Secretary Eric Hargan as a named defendant.
248 Id. at 17.
249 Id. at 17–18.
250 Id. at 76.
251 Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 2018).
252 Id.; see also id. at 262 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
253 Id. at 243.
254 Id. at 245 (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 607; and then citing 7 U.S.C. § 2029(a)(1)).
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community-engagement or work requirement as a condition of Medicaid
eligibility.”255 Because the Secretary “glossed over ‘the impact of the state’s
project’ on the individuals whom Medicaid ‘was enacted to protect,’” the
district court vacated HHS’s approval of Kentucky’s and remanded it to the
agency.256 On remand, Governor Bevin submitted, and the Trump
Administration approved, after a notice-and-comment period, a second, nearly
identical waiver request.257 But the district court stopped the Trump
Administration again by vacating the new waiver.258
The same day the district court vacated the reapproved Kentucky waiver,
it handed down another decision regarding the Trump Administration’s
approval of Arkansas’s Medicaid waiver. Like Kentucky, Arkansas submitted
a Medicaid waiver during the Obama Administration.259 The Obama
Administration initially denied Arkansas’s waiver proposal in part because it
included a work requirement.260 Following the 2016 election and before
President Trump’s inauguration, the Obama Administration approved a
modified waiver from Arkansas, even while it let Kentucky’s languish.261 Some

255

Id.
Id. at 265 (quoting Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1070 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also id. at 274. In
response to the court’s ruling, Governor Bevin eliminated vision and dental benefits for 460,000 Medicaid
enrollees, claiming that the state could no longer afford those benefits. Daniel Desrochers, After Medicaid
Ruling Doesn’t Go His Way, Kentucky Governor Eliminates Dental and Vision, GOVERNING (July 3, 2018),
https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/tns-kentucky-bevin-vision-dental.html [https://
perma.cc/6773-DDFM].
257
Josh James, Kentucky Medicaid Fight Enters Round Two, MOREHEAD STATE PUB. RADIO (Jan. 15,
2019), https://www.wmky.org/post/kentucky-medicaid-fight-enters-round-two [https://perma.cc/9ZLSVJCC].
258 Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019).
259 See Letter from Asa Hutchinson, Governor of Ark., to Hon. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (June 28, 2016), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-ProgramInformation/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/Health-Care-Independence-Program-PrivateOption/ar-works-application-07072016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF79-E2FJ] (requesting permission from
HHS to extend and amend its program for the ACA expansion population, renaming the project “Arkansas
Works”).
260 See Letter from Sylvia Burwell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to Asa Hutchinson,
Governor of Ark. (Apr. 5, 2016) (denying Arkansas’s request because it is not “consistent with the purposes
of the Medicaid program”) (on file with journal); see also Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r,
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Thomas Betlach, Dir., Az. Health Care Cost Containment Sys.
(Sept. 30, 2016) (approving the waiver but denying a work requirement and other provisions from Arizona
and, in the process, concluding that work requirements do “not support the objectives” of Medicaid) (on file
with journal).
261 See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Cindy
Gillespie, Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIPProgram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/Health-Care-Independence-ProgramPrivate-Option/ar-works-amndmnt-appvl-12292017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KJG-PJ9W] (extending the
§1115 project through the end of 2021).
256
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viewed these actions as evidence that the Obama Administration sought to get
as many states as possible to opt in to the ACA expansion, even though
Arkansas’s was a proposal the federal government would have never designed
themselves.262 Once President Trump took office, Arkansas Governor Asa
Hutchinson submitted a request to HHS to amend its Medicaid waiver.263
Specifically, Arkansas requested to implement a work requirement, eliminate
three-month retroactive coverage, and phase out Medicaid coverage of
individuals with household incomes above 100% FPL.264 After a public
comment period, the Secretary of HHS approved the Arkansas Works
Amendment, with qualifications.265 The federal government allowed Arkansas
to implement the work requirement and to reduce the retroactive coverage to
not less than one month.266 The federal government denied the state’s request
to reduce the income eligibility for Medicaid.
Similar to Kentucky, Arkansas residents impacted by the Medicaid
changes challenged the waiver in federal court, which the district court
designated as related to Stewart v. Azar and thus assigned to Judge Boasberg.267
As Kentucky had in Stewart, Arkansas intervened as a defendant, and both
sides filed for summary judgment. In his decision in the Arkansas litigation,
Gresham v. Azar, Judge Boasberg found that, like in Stewart, the Secretary
“neither offered his own estimates of coverage loss nor grappled with
comments in the administrative record projecting that the Amendments would
lead a substantial number of Arkansas residents to be disenrolled from
Medicaid,” making the decision to grant Arkansas’s waiver “arbitrary and
capricious.”268
262 See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1689, 1737–39 (2018); BETHANY MAYLONE & BENJAMIN D. SOMMERS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND,
EVIDENCE
FROM
THE
PRIVATE
OPTION:
THE
ARKANSAS
EXPERIENCE
(2017),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_issue_brie
f_2017_feb_1932_maylone_private_option_arkansas_ib_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT6V-8R7L]; Rebecca
Adams, Federal Officials Give Arkansas Medicaid Waiver, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 27, 2013),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-article/federal-officials-give-arkansasmedicaid-waiver [https://perma.cc/M9N4-UNQL].
263 See Letter from Asa Hutchinson, Governor of Ark., to Hon. Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs. (June 30, 2017) (on file with journal).
264 See id.
265 Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Cindy Gillespie, Dir.,
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. (Mar. 5, 2018) (on file with journal).
266 Id.
267
While HHS objected to this related-case designation, the district court determined the cases shared
legal and factual issues that weighed in favor of retaining the case. See Minute Order, Gresham v. Azar,
363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 18-cv-1900), ECF No. 22.
268 Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 175 (“As Opening Day arrives, the Court finds its guiding principle in
Yogi Berra’s aphorism, ‘It’s déjà vu all over again.’”)
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While the district court’s decision to vacate and set aside Arkansas’s
Medicaid waiver tracked its decision to do the same with Kentucky’s,
Arkansas’s waiver presented an additional wrinkle. Whereas Kentucky’s
changes had yet to take effect, Arkansas’s changes were an amendment to an
existing waiver.269 For this reason, Arkansas and the federal government in
Gresham were in a slightly stronger position than Kentucky in Stewart to ask
the court not to vacate the waiver because of the disruption it would cause to
Arkansas’s Medicaid program.270 The decision to decline to vacate turned on
the “seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt
whether the agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an
interim change.”271 The district court said that for Arkansas, like Kentucky in
Stewart, “the road to cure the deficiency in this case is, at best, a rocky one,”
but that the second factor of disruptive consequences was a “closer call.”272 The
court balanced the disruption for the state administrators against “the harms
that Plaintiffs and persons like them will experience if the program remains in
effect.”273 The court also took into consideration that “Arkansas’s own numbers
confirm[ed] that in 2018, more than 16,000 persons have lost their Medicaid”
and that “[HHS and the State] offer[ed] no reason to think the numbers w[ould]
be different in 2019” and “indeed, once the requirements apply to persons aged

269

Id. at 169, 182.
The district court acknowledged that even though vacatur is “the normal remedy,” courts “sometimes
decline to vacate an agency’s action.” Id. at 182 (quoting Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102,
1110 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
271 Id. (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
272 Id. at 183. The district court considered concerns that vacatur would undermine data collection and
their ability to educate Arkansas Medicaid recipients on the work requirements, which began for some
recipients in June 2018 and others in January 2019. Id. The district court pointed out that even though HHS
was concerned about data collection, the federal government approved the project despite it lacking any
evaluation component and Arkansas did not mention this concern in its summary judgment motion. Id.
Moreover, the district court suggested, Arkansas and HHS could always extend the demonstration project
to facilitate more data collection. Id. at 183–84. As for outreach efforts, the district court acknowledged that
“vacatur of work requirements that have already been implemented may send mixed messages,” but that the
disruption would be minimized since the court was handing down its decision before Arkansas began
disenrolling noncompliant recipients. Id. at 184.
273 Id.
270

414

115:361 (2020)

Litigating Welfare Rights

19–29” would be “likely to rise.”274 The court concluded that the Arkansas
Works Amendments could not stand.275
Judge Boasberg’s opinions could have taken a different tack and stood
against sloppy agency action that intended to cut anti-poverty programs
without following their own procedures. There were other details in the
Stewart record that suggested the illegality of the Trump Administration’s
actions. For instance, CMS published its letter to state Medicaid directors and
approved the Kentucky waiver the following day.276 However, the waiver
approval had the date filled in for a prior day.277 If ever there was a smoking
gun in an administrative record showing that an agency decision was
unreasoned, this was it. CMS had drafted the waiver request to fit Kentucky’s
waiver—a backwards process which betrayed its arbitrary action.278 Instead,
Stewart v. Azar reads as broader defense of legality in administrative action,
or, at the very least, meaningful judicial oversight of an agency action that
could undo a longstanding statutory regime.
Recently, the D.C. Circuit considered appeals by the federal government,
Kentucky, and Arkansas challenging Judge Boasberg’s decisions. At oral
argument, the panel voiced concern that the federal government and the two
states were attempting through agency action to add an additional condition to
Medicaid without any authority from Congress to do so.279 These concerns

274

Id. at 184–85. In light of this litigation, GOP lawmakers in Michigan continue to push their proposal
to exempt white rural areas from its Medicaid work requirement. Alice Ollstein, Trump Admin Poised to
Give Rural Whites a Carve-Out on Medicaid Work Rules, TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 14, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/trump-admin-poised-to-give-rural-hites-a-carve-out-on-medicaidwork-rules [https://perma.cc/VU4D-NSBV] (discussing proposals in Michigan and Ohio). The question of
whether states can apply these work requirements to federally recognized tribes adds yet another layer of
complexity. Id.
275 Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 185.
276 Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 (D.D.C. 2018).
277 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 46, Stewart, 313 F.
Supp. 3d 237 (No. 18-cv-152).
278 This may be another instance of “regulatory slop” by the Trump Administration. See, e.g., Robert
L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J.
1651, 1653–54 (2019) (describing how “the Trump Administration has doggedly ignored some settled
administrative-law expectations for agency decisionmaking”); Super, supra note 245, at 1593 (arguing that
“[t]he Trump administration, in word and deed, has rejected the broad structural consensus about the means
and limits of administrative law that have existed since the New Deal”).
279 See Oral Argument at 28:18, Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-5094), petitions
for
cert.
filed,
Nos.
20-37
&
20-38
(July
13,
2020),
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2019.nsf/836067B4CDCC615785258490005718B0/
$file/19-5094.mp3 [https://perma.cc/T8GX-NUXN]. For more information about and description of the oral
arguments, see Amy Goldstein, Appeals Panel Expresses Skepticism About Medicaid Work Requirements,
WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2019, 1:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/appeals-panel-expresses-
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became moot for Kentucky as, following Governor Bevin’s defeat in the 2019
election, Kentucky rescinded its waiver request and withdrew its appeal.280 But
the Arkansas waiver remained, and the D.C. Circuit held that the Secretary’s
grant of that waiver was arbitrary and capricious and affirmed Judge
Boasberg’s vacatur.281
In an opinion penned by Judge David Sentelle, the D.C. Circuit rejected
the Trump Administration’s contention that the Secretary’s waiver authority
was unreviewable because the Medicaid Act itself says the Secretary is to grant
waivers “likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of Medicaid.282 The D.C.
Circuit went on to point out that “[t]he district court is indisputably correct that
the principal objective of Medicaid is providing health care coverage.”283 The
Court of Appeals relied on the text of the statute and judicial interpretation by
other circuits.284 The D.C. Circuit also rejected the Secretary’s arguments that
it was a reasoned decision on the grounds that the Secretary’s approval of the
waiver cited alternative objectives like transitioning recipients to commercial
coverage and promoting financial independence, since the Secretary could not
point to anywhere in the Medicaid Act that suggests those objectives were part
of the statutory scheme.285 Judge Sentelle rightly pointed out that Congress has
added language in the purposes of the statutes governing TANF and SNAP as
well as work requirements in both those programs, but that Congress declined
to do either for Medicaid, at precisely the same time they amended the statutes
governing the other two programs.286 The D.C. Circuit concluded that, since
skepticism-about-medicaid-work-requirements/2019/10/11/a8357c4e-eb8a-11e9-9c6d-436a0df4f31d_
story.html [https://perma.cc/9KV7-QENQ].
280 See Gresham, 950 F.3d at 98 (noting that “[o]n December 16, 2019, Kentucky moved to dismiss its
appeal as moot because it ‘terminated the section [1315] demonstration project’” and that “[n]either the
[federal] government nor the appellees opposed the motion” (citation omitted)); see also Alex Ebert, First
Approved Medicaid Work Rule on Chopping Block in Kentucky, BLOOMBERG L. HEALTH & BUS. NEWS
(Nov. 14, 2019, 5:17 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/first-approvedmedicaid-work-rule-on-chopping-block-in-kentucky [https://perma.cc/F9AZ-TJ4W] (quoting Kentucky
Governor-elect Andy Beshear’s victory speech: “In my first week in office I am going to rescind this
governor’s Medicaid waiver”).
281 See Gresham, 950 F.3d at 96.
282 See id. at 96, 98 (reasoning that judicial review is barred “only in those ‘rare instances’ where ‘there
is no law to apply’” (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971))).
283 See id. at 99.
284 See id. at 99–101.
285 See id. at 101–02 (“When Congress wants to pursue additional objectives within a social welfare
program, it says so in the text.”).
286 See id. (pointing out that Congress did not add a work requirement to Medicaid or any language
about promoting work). Judge Sentelle made this point at oral argument. See Goldstein, supra note 279
(quoting Judge Sentelle that the Medicaid, Food Stamp, and TANF statutes “‘are not comparable at all’
because Congress specifically wrote that financial self-sufficiency is a goal of the other two programs
[TANF and SNAP] but has never included that in Medicaid law”); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Can Work Be
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the Secretary failed to consider whether the Arkansas waiver would result in
Medicaid recipients losing coverage, the decision to approve the State’s waiver
was arbitrary and capricious.287
Meanwhile, other states’ efforts to impose work requirements ground to
a halt, even before the COVID-19 pandemic hit. Judge Boasberg blocked
another waiver granted by HHS that would have allowed New Hampshire to
impose work requirements on Medicaid recipients.288 And shortly before the
D.C. Circuit heard argument on Kentucky and Arkansas’s actions, Judge
Boasberg was assigned two other lawsuits involving Michigan and Indiana’s
waivers.289 After the D.C. Circuit sitting, Arizona and Indiana announced
delaying the implementation of work requirements, referencing the
controversies in court.290 Depending on the length of the pandemic, the
Arkansas and New Hampshire litigation will continue, and the cases will test
Governor Bevin’s prediction: “‘We’ll win at the U.S. Supreme Court, but it
takes time’ . . . . ‘And this will be the first entitlement reform of any
significance in America since the mid-‘90s.’”291 Despite Governor Bevin’s
electoral defeat, and although he was proven wrong about Kentucky, he may

Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 788, 788–91 (2018) (providing the background
for this omission).
287 See Gresham, 950 F.3d at 104 (“While we have held that it is not arbitrary or capricious to prioritize
one statutorily identified objective over another, it is an entirely different matter to prioritize non-statutory
objectives to the exclusion of the statutory purpose.”).
288 Philbrick v. Azar, 397 F. Supp. 3d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2019) (“The issues presented in this case are all
too familiar. In the past year or so, this Court has resolved challenges to similar programs in Kentucky and
Arkansas, each time finding the Secretary’s approval deficient.”).
289 See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Young v. Azar, No. 19-cv-3526
(D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (challenging the legality of Michigan’s Medicaid waiver in a manner similar to the
Kentucky, Arkansas, and New Hampshire lawsuits); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Rose
v. Azar, No. 19-cv-2848 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2019) (challenging Indiana’s Medicaid waiver on similar
grounds). While Indiana has represented that its waiver will not reduce its Medicaid rolls, it was likely that
this waiver would meet a similar fate.
290 See Jonathan J. Cooper, Arizona Quietly Suspends Medicaid Work Requirement, ASSOC. PRESS (Oct.
22, 2019), https://apnews.com/1fad03f5d68d4797a24f7f942d0aa430 [https://perma.cc/5PTE-DXSD]; Shari
Rudavsky, State Temporarily Suspends Controversial Work Requirement for Healthy Indiana Plan, INDY
STAR (Oct. 31, 2019, 3:29 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/health/2019/10/31/medicaid-workrequirement-suspended-while-indiana-faces-lawsuit/4110646002/ [https://perma.cc/GG92-YECM]. But see
Corin Cates-Carney, Health Department: Medicaid Expansion Work Requirements Won’t Take Effect in
January, MONT. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.mtpr.org/post/health-department-medicaidexpansion-work-requirements-wont-take-effect-january [https://perma.cc/2LET-WXQN] (pressing ahead
with the work requirements policy due to state law).
291 Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Medicaid Work Requirements Were Defeated at the
Ballot Box Last Night, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
paloma/the-health-202/2019/11/06/the-health-202-mediciaid-work-requirements-were-defeated-at-theballot-box-last-night/5dc1bd3888e0fa10ffd20b7b/ [https://perma.cc/28X7-FUGA].
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yet be proven right about Medicaid as a whole. The Trump Administration and
the State of Arkansas have filed certiorari petitions in the Supreme Court.292
b. SNAP work requirements
The Trump Administration has pursued a similar strategy of reducing
access to SNAP and has been similarly stymied in federal court. The same day
President Trump signed the 2018 Farm Bill, which lacked any structural cuts
to SNAP or increased work requirements for its recipients, Secretary of
Agriculture Sonny Perdue proposed a rule to achieve these changes by other
means.293 In the proposed rule, the Department claimed that it “consistently
approved waivers based on qualification for extended unemployment benefits
because it has been a clear indicator of lack of sufficient jobs and an especially
responsive indicator of sudden economic downturns,” but that states’
“widespread use of ABAWD waivers during a period of historically low
unemployment” suggests that “regulatory standards should be reevaluated.”294
True to form, the Trump Administration’s rule disaggregates the SNAP
caseload rather than cutting benefits directly. It impacts only SNAP recipients
who are considered to be ABAWDs within the meaning of the Food Stamp Act
and implementing regulations. ABAWDs include recipients ages eighteen to
forty-nine who do not have a disability and are not caring for children or other
dependents in their own home.295 The USDA’s rule would limit the extent to
which states can waive a statutory provision that places a time limit on
ABAWDs’ receipt of SNAP benefits. ABAWDs currently can only receive
three months of SNAP benefits in a three-year period unless they meet a work
requirement or are exempted from that work requirement.296 States, however,
can apply to the federal government for a waiver if the state’s unemployment

292

Gresham, 950 F.3d 93.
See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 980 (proposed Feb. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273).
294 Id. at 981, 985.
295 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.24(c) (2019) (excepting individuals from time limits for able-bodied adults if
certain conditions apply). As it happens, two-thirds of SNAP recipients are children, senior citizens, or
people with disabilities. SNAP Supports Children and Families, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Sept.
2018), https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2018/09/snap-supports-children-and-families.html [https://
perma.cc/ZYF2-WTHN].
296 See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o); see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.24(b) (“Individuals are not eligible to participate in
SNAP . . . if the individual received [food stamps] for more than three countable months during any threeyear period . . . .”). See generally Andrew Hammond & MacKenzie Speer, SNAP’s Time Limit: Emerging
Issues in Litigation and Implementation, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. (Apr. 2017) (summarizing SNAP’s
statutory and regulatory scheme for ABAWDs).
293
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rate is above a certain threshold.297 The Trump Administration’s final rule
would require a higher unemployment rate from states to trigger waiver
eligibility, thereby allowing fewer states to qualify for the waivers.298 The
regulation would also require states to reapply for waivers every year—rather
than every two years, thus adding administrative costs—and would prohibit
states from carrying over unused exemptions into the following year.299 The
Department of Agriculture estimates that 1,087,000 SNAP recipients will be
subjected to the new time limit and that “approximately 688,000 will not meet
the work requirement.”300 Researchers estimate that 755,000 Americans may
lose their SNAP benefits under the proposed rule by living in an area that will
lose its waiver.301
As with the Medicaid work requirements, this agency action regarding
SNAP was swiftly challenged in federal court. Before the rule could go into
effect as planned on April 1, 2020, a federal court preliminarily enjoined the
Department of Agriculture from implementing it nationwide. Nineteen states,
the District of Columbia, and the City of New York sued the USDA alleging
that the agency’s rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act for exceeding
its statutory authority, failing to observe required procedures, and being

297 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(4)(A) (allowing states to seek a waiver to suspend the ABAWD time limit for
“any group of individuals in the State” if the requested waiver area “has an unemployment rate of over 10
percent” or “does not have a sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals”).
298 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,782, 66,790 (Dec. 5, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273).
299 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 980, 987–88 (proposed Feb. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273); Danielle
Paquette & Jeff Stein, Trump Administration Aims to Toughen Work Requirements for Food Stamp
Recipients, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/trump-administration-aims-to-toughen-work-requirements-for-food-stamps-recipients/2018/12/
20/cf687136-03e6-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html [https://perma.cc/PB8A-H96C]. The unused
exemptions are the 15% rule. See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Requirements for AbleBodied Adults Without Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 980, 987 (proposed Feb. 1, 2019) (to be codified at
7 C.F.R. pt. 273).
300 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,782, 66,809 (Dec. 5, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273); see also Jacob
Bunge, White House to Tighten Work Requirements for Food-Stamp Aid, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-to-curb-states-control-of-food-aid-11575455401
[https://perma.cc/W68M-TGVN] (discussing rollout of the Administration’s policy).
301 See, e.g., Paquette & Stein, supra note 299; Lauren Bauer, Workers Could Lose SNAP Benefits
Under Trump’s Proposed Rule, BROOKINGS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2018/12/20/workers-could-lose-snap-benefits-under-trumps-proposed-rule/ [https://perma.cc/WTS82U5B] (drawing on research to conclude that “strict enforcement of work requirements will sanction not
only those who are able to work but are choosing not to, but those who are unable to work and those who
are unable to find work or prove that they have met the requirement”).
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arbitrary and capricious.302 A social service organization and individual
plaintiffs also filed suit.303 The lawsuits were consolidated as both made similar
claims and requested that the district court preliminarily enjoin the final rule.
In weighing the propriety of an injunction and a stay under § 705 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, the district court determined that on all issues
but one, the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits that the USDA’s
rule was arbitrary and capricious. While the district court did not address the
plaintiffs’ other claims about whether the USDA failed to observe procedural
requirements, the district court pointed out that USDA received over 100,000
comments, which were overwhelmingly opposed to the rule change, and that
on some comments the “USDA did no more than state that that this evidence
was rejected.”304 The district court, quoting the D.C. Circuit in Gresham,
reminded USDA that “[n]odding to concerns raised by commenters only to
dismiss them in a conclusory manner is not a hallmark of reasoned
decisionmaking.”305
Unlike with Medicaid, which has no statutory provisions or existing
regulations regarding work requirements, the Trump Administration relied on
statutory provisions and existing regulations that permit such requirements for
some SNAP recipients. While the plaintiffs were not in as strong of a position
as the Medicaid recipients were in the aforementioned litigation, the plaintiffs
drew on similar arguments that the Administration had sought to achieve
through regulation what it failed to secure through legislation, and that the
proposed regulation ran afoul of SNAP’s federal statutory scheme.
Furthermore, like in the Medicaid litigation, the government plaintiffs and
SNAP recipients could point to the longstanding practices that have governed
SNAP administration since the provision was enacted in 1996.306
As for the other preliminary injunction factors discussed in Section I.C.2,
they weighed in favor of stopping the SNAP rule.307 The district court credited
the state plaintiffs’ representations that the increased procedural costs
associated with implementing the new rule would be significant and
irreparable.308 On the “balance of [the] equities” inquiry, the federal judge
302 Complaint ¶¶ 93–94, District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 20-cv-119 (D.D.C. Jan. 16,
2020) (contrary to law); id. ¶¶ 94–95 (procedural claim); id. ¶ 95 (arbitrary and capricious).
303 Complaint, Bread for the City v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 20-cv-127 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2020).
304 District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 20-cv-119, 2020 WL 1236657, at *1, *21 (D.D.C.
Mar. 13, 2020).
305
Id. at *21 (quoting Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2020), petitions for cert. filed, Nos.
20-37 & 20-38 (July 13, 2020)).
306 See Complaint, supra note 302, ¶¶ 15–16.
307 District of Columbia, 2020 WL 1236657, at *22–31.
308 Id. at *22–24.
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noted that “[t]he equities weigh sharply in favor of preliminary relief” since
“USDA’s only harm is that it will be required to keep in place the existing
regulation—which USDA has used for 19 years—while judicial review of its
new regulation runs its course” whereas “absent preliminary relief, the state
plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm in the form of massive costs associated
with implementing a sea change in a program that serves over forty million
U.S. residents.”309 Here, the federal court identified the dynamics of fiscal
federalism discussed earlier in this Article. Furthermore, the court, like many
before it in welfare litigation, identified “the grave harm to the individual
plaintiffs who will have to go without the $194 per month they need to buy
food,” not to mention the “[n]early 700,000 people across the country [who]
face the same hardship.”310
In granting the relief sought, the district court pointed out that a
nationwide injunction was appropriate since the affected individuals “reside in
34 states, plus the Virgin Islands and the District, as those 36 jurisdictions
currently have either statewide or partial ABAWD time limit waivers.”311 The
Trump Administration signaled that it planned to appeal the nationwide
injunction, but the COVID-19 pandemic changed its calculus and the
governing law.312 In one of the initial stimulus packages enacted in the wake of
the coronavirus outbreak, Congress lifted all SNAP work requirements
beginning in April 2020 and lasting until a month after the COVID-19 public
health emergency declaration is lifted.313 The Trump Administration appears
committed to pursuing its appeal despite the pandemic,314 but given the
duration of the COVID-19 crisis, the district court’s stay could be the only
court decision on SNAP work requirements before the next presidential
Administration.
3. Public Charge Regulations
While work requirements are the most prominent example of efforts to
undo food and medical assistance through federal agency action, another
example of this strategy of disaggregation is the Trump Administration’s
309

Id. at *31.
Id.
311 Id. at *36.
312 Ashraf Khalil, USDA to Appeal Ruling, Seeks Food Stamp Change amid Pandemic, ASSOC. PRESS
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://apnews.com/e2a2e9be5950a98f4dabcc2649aef332 [https://perma.cc/9U96-8PRY];
Lola Fadulu, Trump Backs Off Tougher Food Stamp Work Rules for Now, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://nyti.ms/3e5m6we [https://perma.cc/N2QA-SMGF]; see also Families First Coronavirus Response
Act of 2020 § 2301, Pub. L. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178, 187–88 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2011).
313 Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 2301(a).
314 Notice of Appeal, District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 20-cv-119 (D.D.C. May 12,
2020), ECF No. 61 (filed by Secretary Perdue).
310
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efforts to discourage legal immigrants and their families from accessing public
benefits.315 Here, the Trump Administration is not changing the eligibility rules
for welfare programs. Instead, the Trump Administration has promulgated a
final rule that creates dire consequences for noncitizens who try to access or
who have accessed these benefits, allowing immigration officials to deny them
entry, withhold permanent status, and deport them.316 In effect, consular
officials could deny admission to any individual who they determined would
be likely to apply for benefits like Medicaid or SNAP.317 For individuals
seeking permanent status, immigration judges could deny a Permanent
Resident Card, known as a “Green Card,” to a noncitizen who had used these
programs or others. As a result, this regulation is expected to spur a decline in
enrollment in immigrant communities, including citizens who are legally
entitled to these benefits.318
Here, too, public interest lawyers sued the Trump Administration in
federal court. And yet, the Administration has better prospects for achieving
its policy goals. The Trump Administration published its final rule on public
charge on August 14, 2019.319 The same day the D.C. Circuit heard oral
argument in the Medicaid work requirement cases discussed above, three
federal district courts issued three preliminary injunctions staying the
implementation of the final regulation.320 Each district court relied heavily on
Congress’s actions (or lack thereof). Each judge relied on Congress’s refusal
to deny eligibility for noncitizens for these programs. The opinions detailed
how Congress considered but rejected such eliminations of eligibility in the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and in the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). These abandoned
315 See Hammond, supra note 219, at 518–28 (2018) (detailing the Trump Administration’s efforts
before the promulgation of the final rule).
316 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at
8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245 & 248).
317 See id. at 41,462; see also Public Charge Update: What Advocates Need to Know Now, NAT’L
IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.nilc.org/issues/economic-support/pubcharge/public-chargeupdate-what-advocates-need-to-know-now/ [https://perma.cc/HU3A-KWR8].
318 HAMUTAL BERNSTEIN, DULCE GONZALEZ, MICHAEL KARPMAN & STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN, URB.
INST., ONE IN SEVEN ADULTS IN IMMIGRANT FAMILIES REPORTED AVOIDING PUBLIC BENEFIT PROGRAMS
IN 2018, at 3 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/100270/one_in_seven_adults_in
_immigrant_families_reported_avoiding_publi_8.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZP8-7PRC].
319 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292.
320 See City of San Francisco v. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1072, 1130–31
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (including four states and D.C. as plaintiffs); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
408 F. Supp. 3d 334, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (including three states as plaintiffs); Washington v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1224 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (including fourteen states as plaintiffs).
A few days later, another federal court issued a more limited preliminary injunction. See Cook County v.
McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1031 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
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statutory changes, the district courts reasoned, were evidence in favor of
stopping the Trump Administration from attaching immigration enforcement
consequences to receiving these benefits.321 One federal district court pointed
to the inaction on the part of Congress since the 1999 Field Guidance was
published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the
predecessor to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to revise
the definition of public charge, including most recently in 2013.322 Summing
up, one federal district court characterized the federal government’s position
as “urg[ing] the Court to take two unsupported leaps of statutory
construction.”323 The first is “a legal conclusion that the purpose of the public
charge inadmissibility provision is to ‘ensur[e] the economic self-sufficiency
of aliens,’” despite evidence of welfare provisions to the contrary. 324 The
second is that “Congress has delegated to DHS the role of determining what
benefits programs, income levels, and household sizes or compositions[]
promote or undermine self-sufficiency,” even though the government failed to
“cite[] any statute, legislative history, or other resource that supports” such a
delegation.325
While the legal arguments echo those made in the Medicaid work
requirements litigation, the plaintiffs differed. The public charge lawsuits
included state, county, and city governments as plaintiffs, which each federal
court concluded had standing to bring such a suit.326 And the district courts
relied on the upheaval of the state governments’ operations as the basis for the
likelihood of irreparable harm, a key element in the balancing test for deciding
whether to grant a preliminary injunction, as discussed in Part I.327

321 See City of San Francisco, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1097–99; New York, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 347;
Washington, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)).
322 Washington, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1216.
323 Id. at 1217.
324 Id. (quoting the federal government’s brief).
325 Id.
326 See City of San Francisco, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1126; New York, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 334; Washington,
408 F. Supp. 3d at 1203. In the last few years, there has been a bumper crop of scholarship on state standing.
See, e.g., Seth Davis, The New Public Standing, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1229 (2019); Tara Leigh Grove, When
Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2016); Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign
Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2017); Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to
Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637 (2016). This
scholarship tends to attribute this multistate litigation strategy to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency that states are “entitled to special solicitude” when it
comes to standing. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007); see also Tara Leigh Grove, Foreword: Some Puzzles of State
Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1883, 1883–84 (2019).
327 City of San Francisco, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1126–27; New York, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 350.
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The Trump Administration has enjoyed some recent, but not uniform,
success in convincing the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court to, at least,
stay the district court injunctions. The Trump Administration immediately
appealed these injunctions to the Second and Ninth Circuits. The Second
Circuit denied the Administration’s request, but the Ninth Circuit stayed both
injunctions from the district judges in California and Washington State.328
Then, the Supreme Court injected even more uncertainty into this controversy
by staying the New York district court’s injunction.329 In a 5–4 ruling, the
Court’s order did not discuss the merits of the underlying lawsuits. The only
indication as to any Justices’ opinion on the merits was Justice Neil Gorsuch’s
concurrence, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which he questioned the
legality of nationwide injunctions beyond the public charge context.330
While the grant of an emergency stay in the New York case appeared to
rely on the overly broad relief, as opposed to the public charge rule itself, a few
weeks later the Supreme Court granted another request for an emergency stay
by the Justice Department for the public charge injunction that only applied to
the rule’s implementation in Illinois.331 Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented
from the grant of the stay, noting that the government “has recently sought
stays in an unprecedented number of cases, demanding immediate attention
and consuming limited Court resources in each.”332 Justice Sotomayor pointed
out that, unlike the nationwide public charge injunctions, the injunction at issue
here only applied to Illinois.333 Therefore, “the Government’s only claimed
hardship is that it must enforce an existing interpretation of an immigration
rule in one State—just as it has done for the past 20 years—while an updated
version of the rule takes effect in the remaining 49.”334 Justice Sotomayor
concluded that that was not the type of hardship that merits the extraordinary
relief the Supreme Court granted.335

328 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Nos. 19-3591 & 19-3595, 2020 WL 95815 (2d Cir.
Jan. 8, 2020) (order denying stay); City of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 944 F.3d
773 (9th Cir. 2019) (order granting stay).
329 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (order granting stay).
330 Id. at 600–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay) (stating that the “real problem here is the
increasingly common practice of trial courts ordering relief that transcends the cases before them”).
331 Wolf v. Cook County, 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020).
332 Id. at 683 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the grant of stay).
333
Id. at 681.
334 Id. at 683.
335 Id. at 681–82 (characterizing the new regulation as “expand[ing] the type of benefits that may render
a noncitizen inadmissible, including non-cash benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (formerly food stamps), most forms of Medicaid, and various forms of housing assistance”).
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Similarly to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, each district court that
considered a public charge challenge emphasized that the decades of
precedent, coupled with the absence of explicit congressional authorization for
the Administration’s proposal, counseled against the federal government’s
position.336 However, with the backdrop of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, the public charge litigation is beginning to diverge from the work
requirements litigation. Federal courts are generally quite deferential to the
federal government in the area of immigration enforcement and have routinely
ruled in its favor in litigation against state and local governments.337 Given the
Supreme Court’s grants of emergency stays, the Trump Administration is in a
strong position to prevail on public charge.
While the Trump Administration’s prospects to effectuate its public
charge and work requirement policies appear to diverge in the federal courts,
the thrust of the policies is identical, betraying how difficult it is to cut
Medicaid and SNAP directly. Instead, agencies will be most successful where
they can argue that Congress delegated more discretion to the agency in
shaping the parameters of access. In both situations, the Trump
Administration’s efforts are not directed at all SNAP and Medicaid recipients,
but rather a specific group such as noncitizens and their families or childless
adults. Nor does either policy take away benefits immediately; instead, they
attach conditions to the targeted groups continuing to receive benefits that can
reasonably be expected to deter use. Some of those subject to the public charge
regulation will fail to enroll or disenroll in Medicaid and SNAP, lest they risk
their legal status in the United States. Some of those subject to the work
requirement waivers will fail to meet or fail to report their labor activity and
will lose access to Medicaid and SNAP as well. In a sense, the Trump
Administration’s actions in this sphere betray the state of poverty law today: it
has become extremely difficult to reduce food and medical assistance in
Congress, and the federal courts will thwart agency attempts to restrict welfare
programs when it conflicts with the agency’s statutory mandate. Rather, the
only avenue available to a presidential administration committed to
retrenchment is to engage individual states through waivers, to disaggregate
recipients by only changing rules as to recipients with specific statuses like
noncitizens, and to attach other conditions to receiving SNAP or Medicaid.

336

See City of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1100–01
(N.D. Cal. 2019); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 334, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2019);
Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1215–18 (E.D. Wash. 2019); Cook
County v. McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1022, 1028 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
337 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (2018) (“By its terms, § 1182(f) exudes deference
to the President in every clause.”); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395–96 (2012).

425

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Each of these efforts will present different doctrinal challenges under
administrative law, but all will follow this pattern.
Inevitably, this is a messy story. The setting includes Congress, the
federal courts, federal agencies, and state governments. The remainder of this
Article takes a step back from the commotion to reflect on what these actions
suggest about how the New Property has changed over time.
III. UPDATING THE NEW PROPERTY
As Part II shows, the Trump Administration and its allies in state
government have run into various legal obstacles in their attempts to undo
SNAP and Medicaid through agency action. The Supreme Court in King,
Shapiro, and Goldberg identified a constitutional dimension of public-benefits
administration and, in doing so, created a path for federal and state agencies
and public interest lawyers to exploit the obstacles peculiar to welfare
retrenchment.338 In effect, courts, agencies, and lawyers operate within a
peculiar fiscal federalism that extends the federal statutory entitlements beyond
what Congress set out to do some fifty years ago. Such an account has
important implications for two scholarly debates: the relationship between
procedure and substantive law and how public law matures absent
constitutional and legislative revision.
A. Procedure–Substance Trade-Off?
Is there an inverse or even perverse relationship between procedural
protections and substantive law when it comes to welfare? Professor Charles
Reich, Justice Black, and the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge all saw
procedure as a cost to government. Professor Reich thought that cost would
protect the individual’s entitlement to her livelihood, whether that be a welfare
benefit or an occupational license.339 Justice Black predicted that the additional
cost of procedures would discourage the government from extending benefits
in the first instance.340 In Mathews, the Supreme Court predicted that the New
Property’s proceduralist bent would cause the political branches to reduce the
substantive benefits to pay for court-mandated process.341

338 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 23 (2014) (suggesting that “agencies are
generally the first—often the primary—interpreters of statutes”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 111 (1990) (“[L]egislative reform must overcome an enormous burden of inertia. It is through
interpretation, in the courts and the executive branch, that regulatory improvements, interstitial to be sure,
can be brought about most easily.”).
339 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
340 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278–79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
341 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
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What Justice Black missed in his dissent in Goldberg and the Mathews
Court misidentified is that there is not a single government body that responds
to judicial decisions on social welfare programs. This unitary theory predicts
the government would respond to judicial decisions imposing costs on the
program by seeking savings elsewhere. Hence, a court order requiring a
Medicaid program to provide in-person hearings for benefit terminations could
lead to a reduction in the generosity of Medicaid benefits. But as this Article
explains, the welfare administrator is responsible for overseeing the procedure,
not the substance of the benefit—the latter being Congress’s remit. Layered on
top of this horizontal division of welfare administration between the
bureaucracy and Congress is the further vertical division between federal and
state government. State government must pay for the procedures, but not the
substantive benefits of federal programs. As a result, state bureaucrats will
respond to court orders in exactly the opposite way the Supreme Court
predicted. Rather than reduce the generosity of the benefits, states may simply
become more lenient—refraining from denying, reducing, or terminating
benefits lest they incur more costs following court-mandated procedures.
In effect, the public law surrounding these programs engenders an unholy,
but not unstable alliance of state government, federal courts, and public interest
lawyers. State government sees SNAP and Medicaid as vital sources of federal
funding.342 Federal courts see SNAP and Medicaid as creatures of federal law,
requiring agencies to operate within the strictures of the APA and the relevant
statutes. And legal aid lawyers see SNAP and Medicaid as crucial support for
their low-income clients. Each of these actors have different reasons for their
shared interest in maintaining the federal statutory regime. The New Property
did not usher in the revolution of welfare as a constitutional right that Reich
envisioned or for which the legal aid community worked.343 Yet Medicaid and
SNAP recipients enjoy increased legal protections and more generous benefits
than they did in 1964—the year Reich wrote The New Property and President
Johnson declared a War on Poverty. This is not to say that Reich’s scholarship

342

Certainly, there is a dark side to this revenue maximization. Professor Daniel Hatcher documents
how several states have used federal funding for Medicaid for various purposes. See DANIEL L. HATCHER,
THE POVERTY INDUSTRY 111–42 (2016). SNAP funding is less likely to be used in such a substitutionary
way because there is no cost-sharing in the substantive benefits and the benefits go directly to the individuals.
Furthermore, while Professor Hatcher indicts this practice, his argument is functionally similar to the one
advanced in this Article. Professor Hatcher emphasizes the structural dimensions of fiscal federalism,
arguing that it transcends party or ideology, causing state officials to vehemently oppose any proposed cuts
to Medicaid. See id. at 111–12.
343 See Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK.
L. REV. 731, 731 (1990) (remarking that “[t]wenty years later, we must confront the fact that the road opened
by Goldberg v. Kelly has not been taken”).
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can claim credit for the forty million Americans who receive SNAP and the
approximately seventy million Americans who receive Medicaid.344 But it is to
say that the procedure–substance trade-off that spooked Justice Black in
Goldberg v. Kelly and the Burger Court in Mathews v. Eldridge has not come
to pass for two of the country’s largest anti-poverty programs. The relationship
between procedure and substantive law in public-benefit programs is more
complex than either Professor Reich’s or Justice Black’s visions. Unlike
Reich’s New Property, which thought of procedure as protecting recipients by
raising the cost of reducing the welfare rolls, this Article recognizes that
procedure also raises the costs to participate in the program. Given the fiscal
federalism written into these programs and the APA framework, the
government agencies administering these programs do not see procedural
dollars and substantive dollars as fungible. If the funding for substantive
benefits and the procedures to administer these benefits are not
interchangeable, there are asymmetries that multiple legal actors can exploit.
This structural account has difficulty explaining why any state would seek
a Medicaid work requirement waiver. According to this Article, no state would
opt to increase procedural hurdles to stymie SNAP and Medicaid applicants
and recipients. While it might be too much to expect a theory to predict each
of the fifty state governments’ actions in this area, it could be that the antigovernment ideology of many in the Republican Party overwhelms the fiscal
incentives inherent in this cooperative-federalism program. Indeed, the
Medicaid litigation in Arkansas, Kentucky, and New Hampshire exposes this
illogic. Judge Boasberg repeatedly pointed out that these states are spending
state resources to kick people off a program that the states are not paying for.345
Regardless of whether this Article can account for each and every government
actor’s behavior in this field, this theory does crystallize the current state of
welfare litigation.
The strategies of the New Property’s adherents and its opponents
underscore this reality. If one canvasses reforms to SNAP and Medicaid
championed by public interest lawyers and advocates, it has not been to
increase process à la Reich’s theory, but rather to streamline it. Legal aid
lawyers have fought for extended certification, telephonic rather than in-person

344 CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(SNAP)
(2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-foodstamps.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UD4G-LPQE]; May 2020 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights,
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollmentdata/report-highlights/index.html [https://perma.cc/NQW6-SS8U].
345 See supra notes 263–275 and accompanying text.
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interviews, adjunctive eligibility, and third-party assistance with enrollment.346
These efforts are a far cry from the formalities of trial-like adjudication
envisioned by the New Property or the Goldberg majority. That is because lowincome people and their advocates want to reduce the costs of accessing and
maintaining government services. No legal aid lawyer wants to subject their
client to more hearings and more documentation, particularly when their client
is raising children and holding down multiple jobs. Further, what has made
these procedural simplifications so attractive in this instance is that
“government” is not singular, but plural. Congress legislates the substantive
requirements of eligibility, but often leaves federal and state agencies to
determine the procedures to enroll and recertify. The state agencies that must
administer these determinations know that their governors and state
legislatures have to pay for a portion of those procedures, but that the federal
government pays for the bulk of the benefits themselves. Indeed, in the case of
SNAP, states only pay for procedure. Therefore, a SNAP state administrator
can either ratchet up the procedure required for an applicant, understanding
that it will come out of the state budget, or the administrator can cooperate with
anti-poverty advocates and create an eligibility system that keeps the benefits
and the federal funding flowing, benefiting the applicant and the administrator
alike. As a result, legal aid lawyers use procedure as much as a sword as a
shield. Goldberg and the other welfare cases from the due process revolution
expected individual recipients to use fair hearings to defend against arbitrary
actions. But over the last half century, public interest lawyers have used these
procedural requirements as a basis to enforce federal law and tie up federal and
state agencies in the courts.347 Notably, the APA provides procedural
protections that avoid the problem of case-based due process—which imposes
time and resource costs on the welfare beneficiaries—and instead impose costs
on agency rulemaking and action instead. Moreover, the mere threat of
litigation yields significant leverage in lawyers’ legislative and administrative
advocacy.348
On the other side of this conflict, those who are ideologically opposed to
welfare programs and the New Property’s legacy have also learned this lesson.
Retrenchers now know that the relationship between procedure and substance
346 See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES & CLASP, IMPROVING SNAP AND MEDICAID
ACCESS: SNAP INTERVIEWS (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-3018fa_asap_snap_interviews.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYD9-L66Q]; SARAH GOODELL, HEALTH AFFS. &
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: NAVIGATORS & ASSISTERS (2013),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20131031.857471/full/healthpolicybrief_101.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TB9-L4ET].
347 See supra notes 131–137 and accompanying text.
348 See Hammond, supra note 176, at 218, 221 (discussing how the whole of these lawyering strategies
is greater than the sum of its parts).
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is more complicated. And they understand that procedure can impose not only
costs on the government, but also on the recipients themselves. The current
retrenchment efforts of the Trump Administration offer a straightforward
application of this theory. Falling short of legislating cuts to SNAP and
Medicaid in Congress, the Administration’s strategy is to increase the
procedures and intensify the process by which individuals prove and maintain
eligibility.
In particular, this updating of the New Property’s insights helps account
for the fight over work requirements and public charge discussed in Part II.
Work requirements in SNAP and Medicaid are best understood not just as a
substantive legal change (i.e., adding work as a condition of eligibility for both
programs), but as an imposition of additional procedures through reporting
requirements. Indeed, these work requirements, like the public charge
regulation, increase the burden of applying for and maintaining access to public
benefits. The Trump Administration’s strategy is the converse of efforts by
previous administrations to extend certification with the elderly and the
disabled.349 Adjunctive eligibility in SNAP and Medicaid, in which receiving
one benefit qualifies a recipient for the other, is another example of the legal
aid strategy. Indeed, the Obama Administration’s HHS spent significant
agency resources to bootstrap SNAP to the additional resources and
streamlined processes that the Affordable Care Act envisioned for Medicaid.350
And the ACA legislated simplified enrollment for its Medicaid expansion.351
The Trump Administration understands that in order to change the
substantive welfare law (i.e., who receives benefits and how much), it needs to
impose additional procedures. By increasing the reporting requirements, the
Administration and its allies in state government can eliminate people’s food
and medical assistance without changing the statutory provisions of eligibility.
From its perspective, it does not matter what the additional procedural
requirement entails. As long as the requirement is an additional hurdle to prove
349 See STATE OPTIONS REPORT, supra note 182, at 27 (detailing how states can opt-in to extended
certification periods for SNAP recipients who are elderly or who have a disability).
350 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MEDICAID/CHIP AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
IMPLEMENTATION: AVAILABILITY OF ENHANCED FUNDING FOR IT SYSTEMS (90/10) (2012) (90% match for
modernization of Medicaid eligibility and enrollment systems until on or before December 31, 2015,
regardless of whether a state participates in the Medicaid expansion).
351 The ACA requires states to use a streamlined Medicaid eligibility process. 42 U.S.C. § 18083(a).
Individuals must be able to file streamlined eligibility forms online, in person, by mail, or by telephone. Id.
§ 18083(b)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.907(a), 435.908(a). And the eligibility determination must occur with
“reasonable promptness.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.906, 435.912(c)(3).
Furthermore, federal law made mandatory the “presumptive” eligibility process for Medicaid, requiring
states to provide immediate, temporary coverage to individuals who appear to their healthcare provider to
be Medicaid-eligible. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(47).
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or maintain eligibility, it can deter access. For instance, drug testing is not just
about signaling that welfare recipients are scroungers and assuring the public
that they are not financing addiction through the government fisc; it also
creates an obstacle that applicants must overcome.352 Work requirements, at a
level of generality, serve the same function. Forcing a recipient to jump
through some additional hoop to maintain benefits—whether that is a drug test
or a work requirement—is a cost to an individual for whom time and resources
are particularly scarce. With these hurdles, the Trump Administration can limit
access to SNAP and Medicaid not with direct cuts, but through furtive actions.
This Article’s account of welfare litigation does not line up neatly with
previous accounts of the relationship between procedural and substantive law.
Several commentators have expressed skepticism about the due process
revolution’s salutary effects on agency action.353 In administrative law, some
scholars have bemoaned how judges have beaten a hasty retreat to the
protection of the administrative state.354 But the resilience of two of the largest
government programs over the last half century suggests that judges have not
been subservient to the administrative state, as some would suggest, but that
judges have helped to protect this area of public law. Administrative law
presumes some background allocation of constitutional authority, and in this
area, judges have not been missing in action. Litigation has proven to be a
useful mechanism for building the public law of public benefits. Of course, this
is not the judicial role that critics of the administrative state envision. These
scholars often exhort judges to construe statutes narrowly to minimally disrupt
private rights best understood through principles of common law.355 But that
352 See 1115 Medicaid Waivers in Wisconsin, FAMS. USA (Oct. 31, 2018), https://web.archive.org/
web/20190707151724/https://familiesusa.org/waivers-wisconsin
[https://perma.cc/EK89-YVVX]
(requiring a “Health Risk Assessment” of Medicaid recipients in place of Wisconsin’s original proposal to
include a mandatory drug test for all Medicaid applicants).
353 See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983) (arguing that the elements
associated with due process in adjudicatory proceedings are inadequate in the social-welfare context); JERRY
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) (proposing a more streamlined
understanding of administrative due process that accounts for institutional competency and political goals);
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the
Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL
L. REV. 772, 820–23 (1974) (proposing management solutions to due process adjudication issued in the
administrative-state context).
354 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION 6 (2016) (describing law’s “considered,
deliberate, voluntary, and unilateral surrender” to the administrative state).
355 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 493–512 (2014). But see Paul
Craig, The Legitimacy of US Administrative Law and the Foundations of English Administrative Law:
Setting the Historical Record Straight 58 (June 30, 2016) (Oxford Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 44/2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2802784
[https://perma.cc/2U7K-HMRG]
(characterizing
Professor
Hamburger’s work as “misconceiv[ing] the administrative state and the way in which it was perceived during
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tradition of using private law as the source of background assumptions for
interpreting public law fails to provide much guidance in areas where public
law itself is the source of private rights. Indeed, that may have been Charles
Reich’s point all along.356 If government is the source of the property right, the
holder of that right must be afforded sufficient legal protections. Otherwise,
Reich warned, the government would abuse its position over the property
against the individual.357
Beyond administrative law, in criminal procedure, Professor Bill Stuntz
is credited with crafting a highly influential account of how the federal courts’
insistence on greater procedural protections engendered ever harsher criminal
law.358 It is certainly possible that Stuntz’s perversity thesis is not inconsistent
with this Article’s account of procedure and substantive law in a different
context. Nor does this Article suggest that procedure builds substantive law. It
does, however, advance the more modest claim that the relationship between
financing procedure and substance in the welfare context is more complicated
than the New Property predicted, or earlier legal scholarship suggests. And
furthermore, the relationship between procedure and substance can only be
understood by tracing which government institution funds and administers
these programs, something Stuntz understood when it came to prosecutors and
police, but which subsequent scholars may misapply to other corners of the
administrative state.

the seventeenth century and thereafter, the very time period on which he draws when using material from
England”).
356 See Reich, supra note 12, at 739 (“As government largess has grown in importance, quite naturally
there has been pressure for the protection of individual interests in it.”).
357 See id. at 786 (concluding that “[o]nly by making such benefits into rights can the welfare state
achieve its goal of providing a secure minimum basis for individual well-being and dignity in a society
where each man cannot be wholly the master of his own destiny”).
358 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781,
810 (2006) (“State legislators and members of Congress have spent where they could govern. Constitutional
law made governing policing hard, governing litigation somewhat easier, and governing punishment very
easy indeed. Legislators have spent accordingly.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 32–34 (1997) (discussing how low funding and
high costs of indigent defense impacts the severity of criminal case outcomes); see also Donald A. Dripps,
Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 883, 902–07 (2013) (discussing different academic critiques of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
decisions around right to counsel); David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure,
119 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56–57 (2006) (summarizing and contesting Professor Stuntz’s argument that the
Warren Court’s “criminal justice revolution . . . has worsened the very ills it was intended to remedy”). But
see Margo Schlanger, No Reason to Blame Liberals (Or, The Unbearable Lightness of Perversity
Arguments), NEW RAMBLER (2015), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/no-reason-to-blameliberals-or-the-unbearable-lightness-of-perversity-arguments [https://perma.cc/X7AZ-H39R] (reviewing
NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014), and
suggesting that perversity arguments might be particularly seductive to academics).
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B. The New Property in the Age of Statutes
The surprising durability of SNAP and Medicaid demonstrates the
enduring strength of the New Property, but the path of both programs moves
us away from a focus on constitutional due process and individual adjudication
to the main events of the administrative state: appropriations and rulemaking.
Recently, scholars have sought to explain how American public law is made
in the absence of constitutional amendments and an increasingly unproductive
Congress.359 One such effort is the notion that some statutory schemes become
so entrenched by judicial interpretations, agency action, and congressional
acquiescence that they are best understood as “super statutes.”360 This literature
often identifies the Social Security Act as a prime example of a federal statute
that, over time, has attained a status of higher law.361 Importantly, this scholarly
literature does not discount the role of courts and litigation. However, instead
of conceiving of courts as fora to resolve individual disputes, this literature
attends to how litigation serves a regulatory function, pushing agencies to
expound on statutory meaning through rulemaking.362 Furthermore, this
litigation can discipline federal policymakers who seek to reverse the course
359

See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457,
1470–73 (2001) (discussing a deliberate strategy during the New Deal to rely on statutes rather than
constitutional amendments); cf. Barbara Sinclair, Question: What’s Wrong with Congress? Answer: It’s a
Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387, 387–89 (2009) (challenging the argument that Congress is
“an increasingly dysfunctional and ineffective institution”).
360 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 6–12 (2010); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J.
408, 412 (2007) (arguing that “[m]any of our most important individual rights—rights against discrimination
based on age or disability, rights to welfare, medical care, and social security—stem from statutes rather
than the Constitution”).
361 See, e.g., Young, supra note 360, at 424–25 (arguing that “American constitutional culture has
generally been reluctant to recognize positive rights to housing, food, health care, or economic security, but
we have created elaborate statutory entitlements to such benefits under the Social Security, Medicare,
Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and unemployment assistance regimes”). There is also
the overlapping literature of “small ‘c’ constitutionalism” and “administrative constitutionalism.” See
Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to
the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (2010) (defining administrative constitutionalism as “regulatory
agencies’ interpretation and implementation of constitutional law”); see also Gillian E. Metzger,
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing
Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 585 (2015); Tani, supra note 52, at 825 (applying
the administrative constitutionalism framework to the Equal Protection Clause). For a dissenting view that
posits that scholars are wrong to conflate administrative law’s stability with entrenchment or some higher
law, see Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1215, 1233–34
(2014).
362 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 624
(2013) (describing “a growing scholarly literature that aims to re-think the contours and work of the
administrative state by training attention on the increasingly blurred boundary between administration and
litigation”).
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of prior administrations’ regulations.363 And because much of federal agency
action turns on the cooperation of state governments, judicial review of agency
action sometimes begins at the behest of state lawmakers.364
SNAP and Medicaid amplify the chorus of case studies in these
overlapping literatures. Neither program has grown through formal
constitutional change or Supreme Court doctrine, as Reich or his
contemporaries would have predicted. Admittedly, Congress has played an
active role in reauthorizing the appropriations for SNAP roughly every five
years through the Farm Bill.365 And Congress has repeatedly expanded
Medicaid by adding additional eligible populations and services.366 But the
precise contours of the programs, like the procedures governing benefits
applications and terminations, have been left to federal agencies.367
Furthermore, Reich’s theory of the New Property and the due process
revolution more generally conceived of an individual’s legal protections in
light of administrative adjudication and constitutional doctrine.368 Yet, as Part
II shows, the durability of SNAP and Medicaid stems not from fair hearings
for individual recipients, but through aggregate litigation, and the strongest

363 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE
U.S. 20 (2010) (“Lawsuits provide a form of auto-pilot enforcement that will be difficult for bureaucrats or
future legislative coalitions to subvert . . . .”). To be sure, scholars in the 1980s identified this “auto pilot”
function. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 227 (1983) (admitting that private lawsuits
“perform[] an important failsafe function by ensuring that legal norms are not wholly dependent on the
current attitudes of public enforcers”); Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184, 198 (1987) (discussing how private enforcement provides a “back-up guarantee of
redress”).
364 See David S. Rubenstein, Administrative Federalism as Separation of Powers, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 171, 174 (2015) (describing administrative federalism as a descriptive inquiry into “the role that
agencies play in shaping the federal–state balance of power today” and a “visionary project designed to
shape federalism’s future through adjustments to the existing administrative system”); Miriam Seifter, States
as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953, 954–56 (2014); see also Katherine
Shaw, State Administrative Constitutionalism, 69 ARK. L. REV. 527, 530–31 (2016) (arguing that
scholarship on administrative federalism is still “focused on federal agencies as the relevant administrative
bodies, even if the interests in question are state interests”).
365 See Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1931, 1967
(2020) (describing the Farm Bill as “[p]erhaps the most-known reauthorization legislation”).
366 See Super, supra note 245, at 1592 (“Congress can override agencies’ interpretations of statutes, but
scarce resources make that difficult, and it rarely does.”).
367
See supra Section I.B.
368 See Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 205 (2008)
(discussing how “[d]uring the 1960s and 1970s, welfare rights held a prominent place on the public agenda
not only in the legislative process but also in mainstream constitutional discourse” (citing, inter alia, Reich,
supra note 12)).
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challenges to government action are not based in the Constitution, but the Food
Stamp Act, the Medicaid Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act.369
These cases and their attendant political controversies are far from over,
but the last four years have shown that executive action in the welfare arena is
still subject to the rule of law. Ideological opponents of the welfare state, even
when they enjoy near-total control of the presidency, Congress, and state
government, cannot easily discard and dismantle anti-poverty programs. So
long as the peculiar fiscal federalism of welfare administration persists,
litigation in the federal courts will too. Welfare recipients can wield the law to
ensure that agencies comport with constitutional due process and federal
statutory commitments. And, as a result, law will remain an effective tool to
protect access to food and medical assistance in the United States.
CONCLUSION
This Article does not seek to serve as an apologia for the ways in which
food assistance and medical assistance have developed in the last fifty years.
Rather, it works to show that the maturation of both SNAP and Medicaid have
made these programs harder to dislodge and dismantle by even a unified
federal government. In light of the ubiquity of committed welfare opponents
at all levels of federal and state government, the absence of a constitutional
commitment to basic assistance, and the comparative stinginess of the
American welfare state, the durability of food and medical assistance in the
United States is, in a word, surprising.
Yet, the rights to food and medical assistance are not held equally across
the American citizenry, let alone the broader society. Put short, public law in
the United States condemns poor Americans to their fates in states. Despite the
resilience of Medicaid and SNAP in American society, access to food and
medical assistance is still not evenly distributed across the country. No
procedural protections will prevent the federal or state governments from
perpetuating these discriminatory practices unless we have a conception of
social citizenship that transcends states’ borders and other divisions in
American society.

369 This contingent, iterative process echoes other discussions of private enforcement. See Sean
Farhang, Regulation, Litigation, and Reform, in THE POLITICS OF MAJOR POLICY REFORM IN POSTWAR
AMERICA 48, 69 (Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Sidney M. Milkis eds., 2014) (“As private enforcement regimes have
diffused across the American regulatory state, the interests formed around them have become more widely
spread and deeply rooted, increasing the political capacity of the coalition to defend the private enforcement
infrastructure from retrenchment.”); Engstrom, supra note 362, at 641 (“Over time, private enforcement may
thus drive legal mandates in very different directions than we might expect if enforcement authority
remained in purely public hands.”).
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